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Police vehicle stops theoretically require a good reason.  Because of 
the vast number of traffic regulations and the low standard of certainty 
required, the police may in effect legally stop any driver at will.  Once 
stopped, the police may treat even non-criminal traffic violators as criminal 
suspects by subjecting them to extensive questioning unrelated to the traffic 
stop, criminal history checks, requests for consent to search, and drug-
detection dogs.  Courts have sanctioned such extensive investigation of 
non-criminal offenders because the courtroom context is most often a 
criminal defendant seeking to suppress evidence of guilt rather than an 
innocent motorist complaining about intrusive investigation.  Because the 
courts are unlikely to limit the carte blanche authority afforded the police in 
practice, we propose legislation to require probable cause for car stops 
based on non-criminal offenses.  The legislation also requires reasonable 
suspicion of criminality as a basis for questioning unrelated to the basis for 
the stop, for criminal history checks of drivers and passengers, for requests 
for consent to search, and for use of drug detection dogs. 
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I. INTRODUCTION:  A CAR STOP FROM THE VIEWPOINT 
OF AN ORDINARY CITIZEN INNOCENT OF CRIME 
Imagine a typical drive to work.  You get up early to avoid the rush.  
You get in your car, accompanied by your spouse, whom you plan to drop 
off on your way.  You check the mirrors.  As you consider the day’s work 
agenda during your normal morning route, a flash of emergency lights 
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appears in your rear-view mirror.  Assuming an emergency, you dutifully 
pull to the right side of the road.  Waiting for the police cruiser to pass, you 
suddenly realize it does not.  You have just been pulled over!  For what?  
Your seatbelt is fastened, you signaled properly, and you were not driving 
too fast.  You wonder, “What’s going on?” 
“Good Morning!  My name is Officer Jones, and I work for the City 
Police Department.  Do you know why I stopped you this morning?” 
“No.  No, I really do not.” 
“That parking permit hanging from your rear-view mirror?” 
“Yeah . . . .” 
“It’s obstructing your view.  You can’t have any items obstructing the 
windshield.” 
“Oh, I didn’t know.  My employer requires me to hang the permit on 
the mirror.” 
“I understand, but it obstructs your view.”  The officer pauses while 
looking inside the vehicle.  “Your employer should have explained that you 
need to remove it while driving.  Let me see your license, registration, and 
proof of insurance.  By the way, while you are getting those, can you tell 
me where you are going this morning?” 
“Uh.  I was just . . . uh.”  Fumbling for the demanded items, you 
answer, “I was just, ah, going to work.” 
“Any contraband in the vehicle you want to tell me about?” 
“Contra?  Um, no.  Here.”  You hand the officer your license, 
registration, and proof of insurance. 
“So is there contraband you don’t want to tell me about?” 
“Uh, no.  I am sorry, did I do something wrong?” 
“I already explained why I pulled you over.  Why are you getting so 
nervous?  Who is that sitting next to you?” 
“I don’t know.  I just . . . I really didn’t know about the windshield 
thing.  This is my husband.”  Officer Jones then asks you and your husband 
to get out of the car and stand on the sidewalk next to the car. 
“Yeah well, stay here for a second.  I have to check your information.  
You are acting a bit nervous, and as you can understand, that makes me 
nervous.  I appreciate the cooperation.” 
“Uh, yes, ma’am.” 
To this point, you are concerned about the delay and somewhat 
intimidated by the flashing lights and the aggressiveness1 of the officer, but 
 
1. Richard R. Johnson claims that “[t]he most consistent set of interpersonal communication 
techniques taught to police officers in the USA is a system called verbal judo.”  Richard R. 
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you assume that you will either get a warning or, at worst, a citation with a 
small fine.2  However, while waiting for the officer to return, you observe 
another police car.  A second officer approaches your car accompanied by a 
large German Shepherd.  The pair walks around your car while the dog 
extensively sniffs the car’s exterior.  Your husband, who suffers from 
cynophobia,3 begins to sweat. 
Meanwhile, Officer Jones comes back to you and asks, “You and your 
husband came up clean.  So, I assume you don’t have either drugs or 
weapons in your car, do you?”  You answer no, and Officer Jones replies, 
“Then I don’t suppose you would mind if I look through your car if you 
have nothing to hide?”  You have some confidential work papers in your 
car, but you assume that the officer will not look closely at those.  You 
prefer to be on your way, because both you and your husband will now be 
late for work, but you feel psychologically pressured to say okay. 
The officer proceeds to search.  She looks through your glove compart-
ment, under the front seats, and then notices your stack of papers on the 
back seat.  She rifles through them, which makes you quite nervous given 
your professional duty of confidentiality, but she then seems satisfied and 
comes back.  “Some interesting papers there—mind if I search your trunk?”  
You are becoming quite nervous about being late for work, but you assume 
that a quick search of the trunk will be your quickest way to proceed, so 
you again reply okay.  The officer looks through your trunk.  After a minute 
or two, she comes back, hands you the key, comments on “your interesting 
hobbies,” and then, finally, to your relief, says, “You have been coopera-
tive, so I am just going to give you a verbal warning to take the permit off 
the mirror and avoid obstructions in the future.  Have a nice day.” 
When you finally arrive at work late, you are upset with the delay for 
such a trivial and obscure offense.  You call your friend, a criminal defense 
lawyer, and describe the encounter.  Your friend explains that nothing the 
officer did is contrary to federal or North Dakota law.  Although there is 
some dispute about the basis for the stop,4 even if the stop was improper, 
you have no real remedy since you did not get a ticket and nothing was 
 
Johnson, CITIZEN EXPECTATIONS OF POLICE TRAFFIC STOP BEHAVIOR, 27 POLICING 487, 489 
(2004).  Our hypothetical dialogue seems consistent with the training described by Johnson. 
2. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-06.1-06(2) (2009) (providing the fee for most moving 
violations in North Dakota is $20). 
3. “Cynophobia:  An abnormal and persistent fear of dogs.  Sufferers from cynophobia 
experience anxiety even though they realize that most dogs pose no threat.  To avoid dogs, they 
may barricade yards or refuse to travel except in an enclosed vehicle.”  MedicineNet.com, 
Definition of Cynophobia, http://www.medterms.com/script/main/art.asp?articlekey=12201 (last 
visited June 6, 2010). 
4. See infra notes 39-40, 148-51 and accompanying text. 
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found.  Once stopped, it was permissible for the officer to ask you for your 
license, registration, and proof of insurance.5  It was also permissible to ask 
you where you were going6 and to get you both out of the car.7  Checking 
your information, and that of your husband, was legal,8 as was using a drug-
sniffing dog.9  Asking for consent to search your car was permissible, even 
without a warning that you do not need to consent.10 
This episode may seem unusual.  To the contrary, we believe that any 
driver may be legally stopped by an officer who merely observes the 
vehicle being driven for a short time.11  In order for the police to stop a 
vehicle, the stopping officer must have a good reason.12  The reason must 
consist of a belief that the person driving has committed an offense or that 
the car contains evidence of a crime.  Most people assume vehicle stops 
rarely occur without legal justification.  The reality, however, is quite 
different.13  The plain fact is that a police officer may indeed stop almost 
 
5. State v. Fields, 2003 ND 81, ¶ 8, 662 N.W.2d 242, 245. 
6. Id. (citing United States v. Jones, 269 F.3d 919, 924 (8th Cir. 2001)). 
7. Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 410-11 (1997) (stating an officer can ask a passenger 
to exit the vehicle); Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111 (1977) (stating an officer can ask 
a driver to exit the vehicle).  See also State v. Haverluk, 2000 ND 178, ¶ 20, 617 N.W.2d 652, 
656-57 (noting the North Dakota Supreme Court has “embraced and extended the Mimms 
rationale”) (citing State v. Gilberts, 497 N.W.2d 93, 95-99 (N.D. 1993); State v. Mertz, 362 
N.W.2d 410, 413 (N.D. 1985) (extending Mimms by allowing an officer to place a traffic violator 
in a patrol car)). 
8. United States v. Gregory, 302 F.3d 805, 809 (8th Cir. 2002) (authorizing police to check 
identification and registration, to direct a driver to step out of the vehicle, and to ask routine 
questions about the driver’s destination). 
9. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 408 (2005). 
10. Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 
231 (1973). 
11. David A. Moran, The New Fourth Amendment Vehicle Doctrine:  Stop and Search Any 
Car at Any Time, 47 VILL. L. REV. 815, 816 (2002).  Professor Moran puts it more simply and 
bluntly, describing what he calls “the Supreme Court’s new, and greatly simplified, Fourth 
Amendment vehicle doctrine: the police may, in their discretion, stop and search any vehicle at 
any time.” Id. 
12. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979).  See Kappel v. Director, N.D. Dep’t of 
Transp., 1999 ND 213, ¶ 10, 602 N.W.2d 718, 721 (noting police need not see a motorist violating 
a traffic law, nor must police “rule out every potential innocent excuse for the behavior in question 
before stopping a vehicle for investigation”).  The North Dakota Supreme Court noted in Kappel 
that a “prolonged stop” at a stop sign, or weaving within a travel lane, or an “abrupt halt” at an 
intersection would each provide a basis for an investigative stop. Id. ¶¶ 12-13, 608 N.W.2d at 721-
22.  This requirement of a “good reason” exists in almost all circumstances, except special 
circumstances like sobriety checkpoints.  See, e.g., Michigan Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 
U.S. 444, 455 (1990) (authorizing suspicionless stops for the purpose of identifying and 
apprehending suspected drunk drivers). 
13. David A. Harris, Car Wars: The Fourth Amendment’s Death on the Highway, 66 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 556, 565 (1998).  Harris concludes: 
[F]or all practical purposes, the venerable Fourth Amendment principle that the police 
need a reason—call it probable cause, reasonable suspicion, or whatever—to interfere 
with a citizen in his or her daily activity has all but vanished for anyone who drives or 
rides in a car.  Traffic stops have become both the occasion and the legal justification 
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anyone, as long as the person is in a vehicle.14  This outcome results from a 
combination of an unbelievably detailed accumulation of traffic regulations 
with a judicial propensity to expand police search and seizure powers to 
promote effective law enforcement. 
Several years ago, coauthor Lockney discovered his vehicle registra-
tion yearly renewal tab was displayed upside down.  For eleven months, he 
was subject to being stopped at will.15  Surely only the professorially 
absent-minded like the author, or criminals like drunk drivers, or 
“offenders” like speeders would be subject to police action on the streets 
and highways.  The majority of drivers, one might suspect, are still immune 
from police stops; most citizens would not think that at nearly any time, 
almost all of us may be legally stopped by any reasonably observant police 
officer.  For many, that notion smacks of a police state.16 
Although coauthor Lockney now has his tab right side up, he 
occasionally neglected to remove his employee parking permit from his 
rear-view mirror.  Most traffic stops result from minor traffic violations like 
an obstructed windshield, which are noncriminal offenses in North 
 
for a new kind of criminal investigation: one that features suspicionless investigation 
on an individual level, without any special governmental need beyond ordinary law 
enforcement.   
Id. 
14. David A. Sklansky, Traffic Stops, Minority Motorists, and the Future of the Fourth 
Amendment, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 271, 298-99.  Sklansky observes, “Because almost everyone 
violates traffic rules sometimes, this means that the police, if they are patient, can eventually pull 
over anyone they are interested in questioning . . . .” Id.  We agree that anyone may be stopped, 
but, as this article demonstrates, we contend little patience is needed due to the vast extent of 
traffic regulation and the low standard required. 
15. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-04-11 (2009) (requiring vehicle plates to be “displayed, 
horizontally and in an upright position,” and registration stickers for only a single year to be 
displayed “in the area designated by the department for the tab or sticker”); see also Bartch v. 
North Dakota Dep’t of Transp., 2007 ND 201, ¶ 10, 743 N.W.2d 109, 111 (holding display of an 
expired registration sticker provided a lawful basis for officer’s stop). 
16. Janet Koven Levit, Pretextual Traffic Stops: United States v. Whren and the Death of 
Terry v. Ohio, 28 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 145, 169-70 (1996).  Our language may seem stark.  Professor 
Levit goes further and compares our situation to that of former South Africa: 
It would be repugnant to American notions of justice if our government were to allow, 
much like the former South African government allowed, random stopping of 
individuals on the street to check for citizenship or identification papers.  It would be 
equally objectionable to allow random stopping of cars to check the validity of the 
driver’s license and vehicle registration, a practice that the Supreme Court explicitly 
invalidated in Delaware v. Prouse.  Our repulsion at the South African example, like 
the Supreme Court’s rejection of the practice of random car stops, is motivated by a 
fear that unfettered discretion creates opportunity for arbitrary and abusive uses of 
police power.  But how different is it to sanction stops of vehicles to conduct intrusive 
and extensive searches and seizures on the basis of minor traffic violations that we all 
commit every time we enter our cars?  The case law demonstrates that no meaningful 
distinction exists. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
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Dakota.17  Many stopped drivers are then subjected to a wide variety of 
police practices designed to uncover crime.  Police stops for noncriminal 
traffic offenses easily escalate into protracted and intrusive police efforts to 
find evidence of criminality, such as drunk driving or possession of drugs.18  
Those police procedures increase the length and intrusiveness of stops by 
allowing the police to treat all traffic offenders as suspected criminals, no 
matter how trivial the offense for which the driver was stopped. 
This article had its genesis in the coauthors’ experience.19  Coauthor 
Lockney discovered it is common knowledge among police officers, 
prosecutors, and judges that a police officer needs very little time to 
discover some reason to stop a driver.  Indeed, it was common to ask, 
almost as a challenge, “How long would it take you to pick a car and find a 
valid reason to stop it?”  Although estimates vary from officer to officer, 
 
17. The authors are unaware of any statistical studies regarding the bases for stops in North 
Dakota.  Studies elsewhere confirm that most stops are for moving traffic violations.  For 
example, a follow-up study of stops by the Wichita, Kansas Police Department found that, 
“[c]onsistent with the 2001 study, in 2004 most stops were the result of an officer observing a 
moving traffic violation.”  City of Wichita, City News, June 16, 2005, at 2, http://www.wichita. 
gov/NR/rdonlyres/53AB36CD-D526-444C-9600-5B98DC0B589C/0/2004stopstudy.pdf (sum-
marizing The Wichita Stop Study 2004 Follow-Up Analysis, http://www.wichita.gov/NR/ 
rdonlyres/82B2A3EF-475D-409B-B4EA-4FC566DE504B/23139/Racial20Profiling20Stop20 
Study20Follow20Up202005.pdf).  In North Dakota, the number of non-criminal traffic offenses 
vastly exceeds the few criminal offenses.  North Dakota Century Code section 39-06.1-02 
provides that a person cited for a traffic violation “is deemed to be charged with a noncriminal 
offense” unless charged with one of the few offenses listed in section 39-06.1-05 as criminal, the 
most common of which are driving under the influence, reckless driving, driving under suspension 
or revocation, and driving without liability insurance.  Common sense, and the authors’ 
experience, suggest that most North Dakota stops are for noncriminal traffic violations. 
18. 4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 9.3, at 359-60 (4th ed. 2004).  Professor 
LaFave describes the efforts of the federal government to use the highways as a battleground in 
the “war on drugs” and to encourage state officers to do the same. Id. at n.2.  Professor David A. 
Harris claims that: 
[P]olice have almost all the discretion they could hope for, and the concepts designed 
to limit police discretion—warrants, probable cause, and reasonable suspicion—are 
never an obstacle when cars are the target.  Viewed together, the cases and techniques 
described here effectively amount to a new exception to the Fourth Amendment’s 
usual requirements: the ‘vehicular drug interdiction’ exception, under which the 
commission of a traffic violation means that, for all practical purposes, the usual 
constitutional safeguards do not apply. 
Harris, supra note 13, at 573.  Parts II and III of this article show that he is not off the mark 
regarding North Dakota legislation and case law, and Part IV proposes legislation to provide 
motorists some degree of protection beyond the measly protection of current Fourth Amendment 
case law.  See infra Parts II, III, and IV. 
19. Coauthor Lockney taught criminal procedure at the University of North Dakota School of 
Law for over thirty-five years.  During that time, he served as the Grand Forks Municipal Court 
Prosecutor for a year in the 1970s, prosecuting all city traffic cases charged by the Grand Forks 
Police Department.  Thereafter, he served as municipal judge for the North Dakota cities of 
Emerado and Larimore for almost thirty years.  Thus, he had many occasions, both in court and 
out of court, to discuss, and sometimes to rule on, police car stops and their aftermath. 
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most police officers agree it takes very little time to legally stop a car.20  
Once a car is stopped, it is often easy to discover something more serious 
than the usual low fine, noncriminal offense that typically served as the 
basis for the stop. 
Coauthor Friese had direct experience with car stops, serving as a 
patrolman for over five years on the Bismarck, North Dakota, police force.  
Subsequently, he enrolled at the University of North Dakota School of Law, 
where he was coauthor Lockney’s student and research assistant.  During a 
criminal procedure class discussing car stops, Professor Lockney described 
his skeptical view of the North Dakota Supreme Court’s approach.  As 
Lockney had written in this same publication,21 he told the class that 
reasonable suspicion investigative stops for traffic offenses were criticized 
by Professor Wayne LaFave as inappropriate for minor criminal cases.22  
North Dakota goes even further, allowing so-called investigative stops 
based on reasonable suspicion even for noncriminal traffic, equipment, and 
parking violations.23  Lockney criticized the North Dakota Supreme Court’s 
“consistent failure in many cases over many years to even discuss the 
serious issue raised by Professor LaFave” as “bad policy, silly, and most 
often, unnecessary”24 because the stops are often actually based on probable 
cause—rendering the reasonable suspicion standard unnecessary. 
Friese raised his hand to comment.  As a police officer, he had found 
the reasonable suspicion standard very useful.  Friese agreed that probable 
cause is often present, but he claimed there were many situations that 
resulted in what he termed a “reasonable suspicion traffic stop.”  As exam-
ples, he mentioned regulations requiring bumpers be of a certain height, or 
steering wheels be greater than a certain diameter.25  Friese claimed that 
when he saw a bumper that appeared too high, or a steering wheel that 
appeared to be too small, he stopped the car based on suspicion of a 
violation and then could use a tape measure or take a closer look to 
“investigate.”  He described how the low standard of reasonable suspicion, 
combined with his list of numerous bases for stops, allowed him to stop 
virtually any car he desired.  Professor Lockney asked Friese if he would 
 
20. Professor Harris notes, “[p]olice officers in some jurisdictions have a rule of thumb: the 
average driver cannot go three blocks without violating some traffic regulation.” David A. Harris, 
“Driving While Black” and All Other Traffic Offenses: The Supreme Court and Pretextual Traffic 
Stops, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 544, 557-58 (1997). 
21. Thomas M. Lockney, Justice Beryl Levine:  Taking Her Title Seriously in North Dakota 
Criminal Cases, 72 N.D. L. Rev. 967, 974-83 (1996). 
22. LAFAVE, supra note 18, § 9.3(a), at 366. 
23. See infra notes 71-72. 
24. Lockney, supra note 21, at 978. 
25. See infra notes 180-83. 
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share that list, and the genesis for this article was born.  Although many 
authors mention the multitude26 of traffic violations for which stops may be 
made, the volume of reasons on Friese’s list surprised the professor, despite 
his experience as a traffic court prosecutor and judge.  The list was shared 
on an Internet discussion forum with other criminal law professors, who 
were similarly surprised. 
After sharing the list with others, the coauthors had trouble agreeing on 
Friese’s claim that he needed the lower reasonable suspicion standard for 
“investigative stops.”  Lockney questioned why an officer’s observation of 
a high bumper or small steering wheel would not satisfy the probable cause 
standard, making the lower standard of reasonable suspicion unnecessary.  
Friese’s response was that he needed to make an “investigative stop” to 
complete a further investigation.  Lockney replied that even where a search 
warrant is sought, requiring probable cause, evidence of a crime may or 
may not be found, and even if it is, further investigation may still be needed 
to meet the requirements for a conviction. 
The discussion has continued for more than ten years, and the authors 
have agreed to disagree about investigative stops based upon reasonable 
suspicion of a traffic violation.  Whether these examples provide reasonable 
suspicion or probable cause is likely the result of the elusiveness of the 
distinction between the two standards.27  The authors’ disagreement puts 
them in good company.  Professor Christopher Slobogin observes that: 
“[P]robable cause” and “reasonable suspicion” are broadly 
defined, with the result that their application to particular facts is 
often difficult to predict.  These developments were inevitable: 
outside of quantifying the standards, as . . . [his article does], 
meaningfully distinguishing between these or any other levels of 
certainty (other than at the extremes) is very difficult.28 
 
26. E.g., Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661 (1979) (noting the existence of a “multitude 
of applicable traffic and equipment regulations”).  Others label the quantity of traffic regulations 
as: a “plethora,” Chris K. Visser, Comment, Without a Warrant, Probable Cause, or Reasonable 
Suspicion:  Is There Any Meaning to the Fourth Amendment While Driving a Car?, 35 HOUS. L. 
REV. 1683, 1690 n.44 (1998-1999); “host,” United States v. Duque-Nava, 315 F. Supp. 2d 1144, 
1160 (D. Kan. 2004); and “vast number,” Sherry F. Colb, The Qualitative Dimension of Fourth 
Amendment “Reasonableness,” 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1642, 1651 (1998). 
27. State v. Mantle, 779 S.W.2d 357, 362 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989) (Maus, J., dissenting) (stating 
“[t]he distinction between reasonable suspicion and probable cause is elusive and a matter of 
degree.”). 
28. Christopher Slobogin, The World Without a Fourth Amendment, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1, 72 
(1991) (footnotes omitted).  As his title signifies, Professor Slobogin imagines how we would 
regulate searches and seizures if the Fourth Amendment did not exist.  Although he compares his 
imagined regulation with Fourth Amendment law and Supreme Court law, he ultimately contends 
his imagined regulation would be an improvement over existing Fourth Amendment law created 
by the courts. Id. at 75-78.  We propose instead that better regulation is more likely to be achieved 
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Citing Professor LaFave’s famous treatise,29 Slobogin agrees the 
difference between probable cause and reasonable suspicion lies in the 
degree of probability required, but that comparison on that area is difficult 
because “it is less than clear precisely what quantum of probability is 
required.”30  He quotes Professor LaFave’s claim that the distinction “is 
well illustrated by the case of Luckett v. State,” where the court “properly 
concluded” an officer lacked probable cause but had reasonable suspicion 
to stop a car based on the color and first three characters of a license plate 
because of the proximity to the crime in time and space.31  Slobogin 
responds: 
[I]f this case is considered a good illustration of how probable 
cause and reasonable suspicion can be distinguished, it makes my 
point.  I would argue that probable cause to arrest existed on these 
facts (even if, after stopping the car, nothing further alerted the 
officer’s suspicion).  The chances are extremely high that the car 
stopped was the car described by the radio broadcast and fairly 
high (given the short time between the burglary and the stop) that 
the people in it were those who fled the burglary.32 
Slobogin also notes that “the police are no better than the courts (or law 
professors) at making the distinction between probable cause and reason-
able suspicion.”33  The fact that Professors LaFave and Slobogin cannot 
agree on whether a particular case demonstrates probable cause or 
 
through legislation, at least in the area we discuss—car stops and subsequent police investigation. 
See infra Part IV. 
29. Professor LaFave is the preeminent scholar of the Fourth Amendment.  He has written a 
five volume treatise on the Fourth Amendment (itself a mere sentence), now in its fourth edition.  
The University of Illinois, Center for Advanced Study observes: 
Professor LaFave is a prominent scholar and expert in the field of criminal justice.  He 
has written extensively on criminal law and criminal procedure, especially on the 
subject of arrest, search, and seizure.  His work has had a profound influence on 
judicial decisions in these areas; his writings have been quoted or cited in more than 
10,000 reported state and federal appellate court opinions, including more than 120 
U.S. Supreme Court cases. 
University of Illinois Center for Advanced Study, http://www.cas.uiuc.edu/faculty/ 
ViewPerson.aspx?Guid=797CD7E1-3215-4CE4-B147-ADD0F78C370B&Role=e (last visited 
June 6, 2010).  When teaching criminal procedure, author Lockney opines that to litigate a Fourth 
Amendment issue without checking LaFave’s position is tantamount to malpractice.  LaFave’s 
suggestions for Fourth Amendment rules to govern police procedure for vehicle stops inspire most 
of our proposals.  We agree with LaFave’s suggestions but, because the courts generally do not, 
we suggest legislative rules in Part IV of this article. 
30. Slobogin, supra note 28, at n.232 (quoting 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE:  
A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 4.3(c), at 431 (2d ed. 1987)). 
31. Id. at n.232. 
32. Id. 
33. Id. 
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reasonable suspicion underscores the authors’ belief that the distinction we 
have debated for years is not particularly helpful in guiding police conduct, 
however unrealistically it may be fixed in courts’ car stop jurisprudence, 
including the North Dakota Supreme Court.34 
This article explicates the authors’ contention that police may stop 
drivers very easily.  Part II describes the viewpoint of the courts, which 
created the legal status quo.35  Part III shows the difficulty of translating 
court doctrine into meaningful guidance for police through a hypothetical 
training dialogue, including discussion of an expansive list of legal bases 
for stops.36  In Part IV, the authors propose legislation to curb the court-
created status quo of at-will stops by proposing protections for motorists 
suspected of noncriminal traffic offenses.37  Alternatively, the authors 
propose legislation to make the current situation, at-will stops and intrusive 
investigations for all drivers, even those not suspected of any crime, a 
matter of clear legislative policy.38 
II. THE VIEWPOINT OF COURTS 
This article began with a scenario of a driver being stopped on the basis 
of a police officer’s belief that a parking permit hanging from the rear-view 
mirror obstructed the driver’s view.  North Dakota law provides: 
A motor vehicle must be equipped with a windshield.  An individ-
ual may not drive any motor vehicle with any sign, poster, or other 
non-transparent material upon the front windshield, side wings, or 
side or rear windows which obstructs the driver’s clear view of the 
highway or any intersecting highway.39 
A reasonable reading of the statute would suggest that a hanging permit 
is not “upon” the windshield.  Moreover, given the number of people who 
drive with such hanging permits—not to mention the ever popular air-
fresheners, graduation tassels, religious medals, and other such 
 
34. See City of West Fargo v. Ross, 2001 ND 163, 634 N.W.2d 527.  In Ross, the court 
analyzed reasonable suspicion for a stop where an officer observed a suspended driver operating a 
vehicle. Id. ¶¶ 1-2, 634 N.W.2d at 528.  The officer’s observations clearly established probable 
cause for the stop and an arrest, yet the court specifically labeled the stop “investigatory.” Id. ¶ 12, 
634 N.W.2d at 529.  Our speculation about why a court, like ours, would strain to discuss an 
investigatory stop when the stop was so clearly based on probable cause is discussed in Part II of 
this article. 
35. See infra Part II. 
36. See infra Part III. 
37. See infra Part IV. 
38. Id. 
39. N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-21-39(1) (2009). 
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accoutrements40—it seems few drivers believe that their clear view is 
obstructed. 
Assume the driver in our hypothetical scenario is a state judge.  Would 
the judge believe the stop was justified by section 39-21-39(1) of the North 
Dakota Century Code?  It seems reasonable to assume she would deny she 
had anything “upon” her windshield.  Moreover, even if the parking permit 
was “upon” the windshield, she would not likely believe the permit 
obstructed her clear view of the road.  Even a driver as knowledgeable as a 
judge, however, would probably not be aware of the language of the statute 
at the time of the stop.  Of course, in most similar stops, like that of the 
sober and otherwise law-abiding judge, the inconvenience is not terrible, 
and the incident might well be forgiven and forgotten. 
Alas, the judicial driver’s story is not the way such issues generally get 
resolved in court.  Instead, litigated stops most often involve either a 
drinking driver or the discovery of drugs.41  The courts’ theory of protection 
under the Fourth Amendment and the police practice of “anything goes” 
seemingly conflict.  Professor LaFave’s treatise suggests numerous ways in 
which the Fourth Amendment should be interpreted to guide police 
conduct,42 but courts have generally not implemented his thoughtful recom-
mendations regarding routine car stops when interpreting the law regarding 
traffic stops.43  After many years of following, teaching, and practicing 
 
40. See Gordon v. State, 901 So. 2d 399, 402 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (noting “[m]any 
motorists in the United States drive with objects hanging from the rear-view mirrors of their 
vehicles.  The reported cases reflect the wide variety of such objects”).  Typical items include:  air 
fresheners, golf ball-sized spherical crystals, parking placard, medic alert card, dog tags, Mardi 
Gras-type beads, St. Christopher medal, graduation tassel, cross hanging on a chain, fuzzy dice, 
garter belt, Masonic emblem, and handcuffs. Id. at n.4. 
41. E.g., State v. Westmiller, 2007 ND 52, 730 N.W.2d 134 (addressing drunk driving); In re 
K.H., 2006 ND 156, 718 N.W.2d 575 (involving drunk driving); State v. Haibeck, 2004 ND 163, 
685 N.W.2d 512 (discussing drugs); Hanson v. Director, North Dakota Dep’t of Transp., 2003 ND 
175, 671 N.W.2d 780 (concerning drunk driving); State v. Leher, 2002 ND 171, 653 N.W.2d 56 
(relating to actual physical control of a vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor); In 
re T.J.K., 1999 ND 152, 598 N.W.2d 781 (regarding drunk driving); Kahl v. Director, North 
Dakota Dep’t of Transp., 1997 ND 147, 567 N.W.2d 197 (pertaining to drunk driving); State v. 
Storbakken, 552 N.W.2d 78 (N.D. 1996) (considering drunk driving); Zimmerman v. North 
Dakota Dep’t of Transp. Director, 543 N.W.2d 479 (N.D. 1996) (addressing drunk driving); State 
v. Hawley, 540 N.W.2d 390 (N.D. 1995) (concerning actual physical control); City of Wahpeton 
v. Roles, 524 N.W.2d 598 (N.D. 1994) (involving drunk driving); State v. Stadsvold, 456 N.W.2d 
295 (N.D. 1990) (considering drunk driving).  But see State v. Fields, 2003 ND 81, 662 N.W.2d 
242 (involving drug offenses—conviction reversed). 
42. See generally LAFAVE, supra note 18, § 9.3. 
43. See, e.g., State v. Guscette, 2004 ND 71, ¶ 34, 678 N.W.2d 126, 132 (Maring, J., 
dissenting) (criticizing the court’s determination of consent in the context of a traffic stop) (citing 
4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 9.3(a), at 49 (3d ed. & Supp. 2004)).  Another 
author explains the courts’ status quo this way: 
[M]ost of the recent cases can be justified only by a sense that police need to have 
every imaginable advantage in stopping automobiles.  The current ad hoc, police-
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traffic stop law, we have concluded it is our reliance on the courts to 
interpret and enforce constitutional doctrine regarding vehicle stops that is 
misplaced.  Courts are particularly ill-suited to protect motorists’ privacy 
because of the context of criminal cases on appeal.  That context most often 
involves a drunk driver or drug offender,44 and the main remedy—exclusion 
of evidence—favors criminals.  Judicial intervention offers the accused a 
benefit—suppression of evidence found as a result of the illegality—and 
sometimes a total victory when it leads to a dismissal or acquittal for lack of 
other sufficient evidence.  As a result, appellate courts are not directly 
asked to protect innocent drivers like our hypothetical judge, but instead do 
so indirectly and in a context that favors a guilty criminal defendant.45 
Relying on courts to develop rules of conduct for police has resulted in 
a jumble of confusing and often inconsistent rulings.46  To call them “rules” 
is a stretch.  If one thinks of basic legal process methodology, the “holding” 
of each case is to be interpreted based upon the particular facts in light of 
the issue decided and the reasoning offered.  Interpreting a judicial opinion 
is heady stuff for law students, lawyers, and judges, but it is a poor way to 
guide police officers.  One good example of confusion is the authors’ 
debate about the difference between probable cause and reasonable 
suspicion as standards of certainty.47  If lawyers are confused, how can we 
expect the police to understand? 
 
always-win regime makes no attempt to attain an even balance between the competing 
concerns of law enforcement and officers’ safety, on the one hand, and citizens’ 
freedom from unwarranted interference in daily activities on the other. 
Harris, supra note 13, at 557-58. 
44. See supra note 41. 
45. See Akhil Amar, The Future of Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 33 AM. CRIM. L. 
REV. 1123, 1133-34 (1996).  Amar says: 
[T]he exclusionary rule is wrong, as a constitutional rule, precisely because it creates 
huge windfalls for guilty defendants but gives no direct remedy to the innocent woman 
wrongly searched.  The guiltier you are, the more evidence the police find, the bigger 
the exclusionary rule windfall; but if the police know you are innocent, and just want 
to hassle you (because of your race, or politics, or whatever) the exclusionary rule 
offers exactly zero compensation or deterrence. 
Id.  The exceptional case involves a trial court suppression and an appeal by the prosecution. N.D. 
CENT. CODE § 29-28-07(5) (2007).  Nonetheless, we believe the prosecution wins most of its 
appeals too because of court aversion to suppressing evidence relevant to guilt.  See, e.g., State v. 
Glaesman, 545 N.W.2d 178, 179 (N.D. 1996) (reversing, upon prosecution’s appeal, the district 
court’s ruling that an officer lacked reasonable and articulable suspicion to stop defendant); State 
v. Nelson, 488 N.W.2d 600, 601 (N.D. 1992) (reversing the trial court’s ruling that a stop was 
unreasonable on appeal by prosecution). 
46. Thomas M. Lockney, An Open Letter to the North Dakota Attorney General Concerning 
Search and Seizure Law and the Exclusionary Rule, 62 N.D. L. REV. 17, 21 (1986). 
47. See supra notes 22-27 and accompanying text; see also infra Part III. 
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The Fourth Amendment explicitly requires “probable cause” as the 
basis for warrants.48  However, in 1968, the United States Supreme Court 
created the now well-known doctrine of investigative seizures, requiring 
something less than probable cause—so-called “reasonable suspicion” or 
“reasonable articulable suspicion” that the person stopped may be a 
criminal.49  This expansion of Fourth Amendment law, permitting what are 
now called “Terry stops,” was controversial.50  In creating the doctrine, the 
United States Supreme Court was evaluating suspicion of felony level 
criminal activity. 
How does the reasonable suspicion analysis apply to traffic stops?  
Most traffic stops in North Dakota are based on offenses that were 
“decriminalized” by the legislature and converted into so-called “admini-
strative offenses” in the 1970s.51  The law revision was a pragmatic 
recognition that the typical low-level traffic offenses did not merit the 
heavy artillery and battle procedures of traditional criminal law.52  The 
North Dakota Legislature established two classes of traffic offenses: (1) 
noncriminal administrative offenses, with simplified procedure and 
specified fines as the only sanction; and (2) criminal offenses, with 
traditional procedures and jail as a possible penalty.53  Other legislation, 
 
48. “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
49. See generally Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (permitting warrantless seizures when 
officers have reasonable suspicion of criminal activity). 
50. See generally John Q. Barrett, Deciding the Stop and Frisk Cases:  A Look Inside the 
Supreme Court’s Conference, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 749 (1998) (outlining the Supreme Court’s 
internal controversy in stop-and-frisk cases); Lewis R. Katz, Terry v. Ohio at Thirty-Five:  A 
Revisionist View, 74 MISS. L.J. 423 (2004) (outlining the development of the stop-and-frisk 
doctrine and its controversy); Russell L. Weaver, Investigation and Discretion:  The Terry 
Revolution at Forty (Almost), 109 PENN ST. L. REV. 1205 (2005) (noting Terry v. Ohio has 
profoundly influenced the law of warrantless seizures). 
51. See Senate Bill No. 2033, 45th N.D. Legis. Sess. (ND. 1973); see also N.D. CENT. CODE 
§ 39-06.1-02 (2009) (noting administrative traffic violations are deemed “noncriminal” offenses). 
52. See Summary of Senate Bill No. 2033 Before the S. Judiciary Committee, 1973 45th N.D. 
Legis. Sess. 1 (N.D. 1973) [hereinafter Summary of S.B. 2033] (statement of Senator Barth, 
Sponsor, 35th District) (stating, “Our courts are overloaded now with traffic offenses, and this bill 
would alleviate the problem.”).  Then-Bismarck Municipal Judge Harry Pearce explained: 
On a weekend, we may have as many as 40 cases for Monday morning for minor 
traffic [sic] offenses . . . .  As it stands now, we do the traffic violator a great injustice. 
This is the only way we can go and non-judicial punishment is the only way it will 
work. 
Id. 
53. Id.  Senate Bill 2033 established section 39-06.1-02, a section of code entitled “Traffic 
violations noncriminal—Exceptions—Procedures.”  The Senate Summary of the Bill explains: 
Senate Bill No. 2033 provides a different method of disposition of most traffic 
offenses.  The bill starts with the premise these traffic offenses are noncriminal, and 
then establishes a procedure for disposing of them which does not involve either the 
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also contained in North Dakota Century Code title 39, pertaining to motor 
vehicles, specifies the duties of “halting officers” making noncriminal 
traffic stops, and generally prohibits taking a traffic violator into custody.54 
The existing legislation does not specify the required level of certainty 
a police officer must have to make such a stop.  Enter the courts.  Professor 
LaFave has long advocated that power to stop for investigation based on 
reasonable suspicion should be limited under the Fourth Amendment to 
“serious” crimes.55  This controversial issue56 deserves serious considera-
tion,57 but our state supreme court, not alone in this regard,58 has long and 
consistently ignored it.59  Our court has not provided meaningful analysis. 
The authors, after considering the jurisprudence of the North Dakota 
Supreme Court over many years, believe that effective limits, if any are 
possible, will not come from the judiciary.  Instead, the legislature should 
consider the issues raised in this article and determine what balance 
between crime control and privacy protection it thinks appropriate for the 
 
right to a jury trial or any possibility that the offender could be incarcerated . . . .  Any 
person who is cited for a state or municipal traffic offense, other than the serious ones 
listed above [e.g. DWI, reckless driving, negligent homicide], has several [noncriminal 
procedural] alternatives available to him. 
Summary of S.B. 2033, supra note 52. 
54. § 39-07-07. 
55. Professor LaFave states that: 
An express limitation upon Terry stops on reasonable suspicion to those instances in 
which the suspected offense is one “involving danger of forcible injury to persons or 
of appropriation of or damage to property,” so that probable cause would be required 
for most traffic stops (except, e.g., driving under the influence), would be one 
significant step toward enhancing the Fourth Amendment rights of suspected traffic 
violators[.] 
LAFAVE, supra note 18, § 9.3(a), at 366. 
56.  Id.  Professor LaFave further states, “when it comes to traffic violations . . . , virtually 
anyone (even a Supreme Court Justice) can readily be stopped, suggesting a need for some 
additional limitation upon the authority to stop[.]” Id. 
57. See Recent Cases, Criminal Procedure—Fourth Amendment—Search and Seizure—
Tenth Circuit Applies Reasonable Suspicion Standard to Stops for Minor Traffic Infractions—
United States v. Callarman, 273 F.3d 1284 (l0th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 1950 (2002), 
116 HARV. L. REV. 697, 704 (2002).  The controversy abounds: 
Over a thirty-four-year period—from the year immediately preceding Terry up to 
Callarman—the law has moved from requiring probable cause for all seizures, to 
allowing temporary seizures on reasonable suspicion of potentially dangerous 
offenses, to, as exemplified in Callarman, allowing temporary seizures on reasonable 
suspicion of the most minor of offenses.  It is conceivable that over the next thirty 
years courts could erode Fourth Amendment protections even more. Courts, scholars, 
and citizens should be aware that decisions such as Callarman push in that direction. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
58. David A. Moran, Traffic Stops, Littering Tickets, and Police Warnings:  The Case for a 
Fourth Amendment Non-custodial Arrest Doctrine, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1143, 1155-57 (2000). 
59. Id.  Professor Moran observes that “[p]erhaps no court has applied Terry to routine traffic 
stops as often as the North Dakota Supreme Court, which has done so on at least eight occasions 
since 1994.” Id. at 1156 n.87. 
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citizens of the state.60  Although some suggest executive or administration 
regulation by the police themselves,61 we do not believe significant self-
regulation to limit investigative power is likely in North Dakota. 
Legislative action would also be superior to judicial action because 
reliance on court decisions, enforced by the exclusionary rule, assumes the 
police know the rules.  But rules made by court decisions, although part of 
the common law inheritance from England, suffer from many defects that 
limit their effectiveness in guiding police conduct.  Appellate court rules 
arise only by the accidental feature that they were raised by trial lawyers 
and appealed to the point of becoming a binding decision.  That means such 
 
60. See Ronald J. Bacigal, Making the Right Gamble: The Odds on Probable Cause, 74 
MISS. L.J. 279 (2004).  Writing about probable cause and the Fourth Amendment, Professor 
Bacigal begins:  “More so than any other provision of the Bill of Rights, the Fourth Amendment 
has always been a deadly serious gamble.  How much of our collective security are we willing to 
risk in order to promote individual freedom?” Id. at 279.  We argue the courts are not necessarily 
the best odds makers for the gamble, especially in the context of noncriminal car stops.  See 
generally 1 JOSHUA DRESSLER & ALAN MICHAELS, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 34 
(4th ed. 2006).  Dressler and Michaels conclude with the “pragmatic point” that “[m]ost conflicts 
between the police and private individuals never reach the courts, much less can be resolved by 
the Supreme Court.” Id. at 34-35.  Thus, as a practical matter, the hard work must be done by 
legislators and executive officers. Id.  See generally Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and 
New Technologies:  Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801 
(2004) (illustrating a proposed preference for legislation over adjudication in the area of “new 
technologies” and Fourth Amendment protections).  Although stopping vehicles is hardly new 
police technology, much of Professor Kerr’s skepticism about relying on courts and his proposal 
for legislation supports the shift in emphasis we propose in this article.  More generally, after 
assessing the role of courts, juries, legislatures, and executive agencies, Professor Bacigal earlier 
concluded that: 
Historically, legislators and administrators have been minor players in search-and-
seizure jurisprudence, but they have the potential to be the greatest heroes of the 
Fourth Amendment’s morality tale because they are best situated to protect the people 
by regulating and controlling law enforcement officials-the actors who most directly 
impact on citizens’ Fourth Amendment interests. Should legislators or administrators 
fail to live up to their potential, they can be educated, prodded, or removed from office 
by the people. 
Ronald C. Bacigal, Putting the People Back into the Fourth Amendment, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
359, 431 (1994). 
61. See, e.g., Harris, supra note 13, at 576-79.  In their path-breaking criminal procedure 
book, Professors Miller and Wright provide examples of police-adopted rules and policies that 
cabin some of the police practices we discuss. MARC LOUIS MILLER & RONALD F. WRIGHT, 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURES: CASES, STATUTES, AND EXECUTIVE MATERIALS (3d ed. 2007).  We 
focus, however, on the legislature because we think legislative concern for drivers’ privacy is 
more likely in North Dakota than police self-restriction.  See Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 
1723-24 (2009) (prohibiting categorical searches of vehicles incident to arrest).  In Gant, the court 
noted the concept of searching all vehicles incident to arrest of an occupant was “widely taught in 
police academies.” Id. at 1722.  Moreover, law enforcement officers extensively relied on this 
broad court-created rule for twenty-eight years. Id.  The court noted, “[c]ountless individuals 
guilty of nothing more serious than a traffic violation have had their constitutional right to the 
security of their private effects violated as a result.” Id. at 1722-23.  In Gant, the searching officer 
testified the search was conducted “[b]ecause the law says we can do it.” Id. at 1715.  In other 
words, we believe that North Dakota police will generally go as far in looking for criminals as the 
law allows, even while inconveniencing many more innocent drivers. 
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rules exist subject to the vagaries of case and issue selection by lawyers and 
judges.  The rules also are written by judges for lawyers and other judges; 
while one can argue about whether the judiciary or the legislature writes 
clearer rules, court decisions are often unclear to many, including the 
police.  Moreover, supposed neutrality is doubtful given that one would be 
hard pressed to point to a bright-line rule created by the United States 
Supreme Court that favors defendants.62  Statistically, most defendants are 
guilty, and that underlies some of the disparity between rulings for the 
prosecution and criminal defendants.  The focus might shift if the question 
were rhetorically framed as “crime control versus innocent citizens’ pri-
vacy,” but even with that change, there are many reasons judges are less 
suited to strike the balance.  If judges rule in the defendant’s favor, they 
make it easier for an accused criminal to get an advantage, even a possible 
victory.  North Dakota judges are elected, and it would be unrealistic to 
think they are unaware of the reality that decisions that favor the prosecu-
tion seldom receive adverse publicity. A decision in favor of a criminal’s 
Fourth Amendment claim, however, may be criticized by the media but is 
seldom portrayed as a “victory for everyone’s privacy.” 
A prime example of a court straining to rule against a drunk driver is 
City of Bismarck v. Uhden,63 the North Dakota Supreme Court decision that 
solidified the status of reasonable suspicion as an adequate basis for a minor 
traffic offense stop, which was subsequently applied even to noncriminal or 
“administrative” offenses.64  In 1969, the year after Terry was decided, the 
legislature enacted North Dakota Century Code section 29-29-21, which 
authorized investigative stops based on reasonable suspicion for a 
reasonably short list of crimes.65  The statute specifically limited the new 
Terry authority to make reasonable suspicion stops to investigation of 
felonies, misdemeanors involving weapons, and possession of controlled 
drugs.66  Apparently nobody noticed the statute for years, while the North 
 
62. LaFave wryly observes that the United States Supreme Court has “‘consistently 
eschewed bright-line rules, instead emphasizing the fact-specific nature of the reasonableness 
inquiry’ (except, of course, when the bright line favors the prosecution rather than the defendant).” 
LAFAVE, supra note 18, § 9.3(g), at 405 (quoting Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 34 (1996)).  For 
a general introductory discussion of bright-line rules versus case-by-case adjudication, see 
DRESSLER & MICHAELS, supra note 60, at 35. 
63. 513 N.W.2d 373 (N.D. 1994). 
64. See State v. Zimmerman, 516 N.W.2d 638, 640 (N.D. 1994) (applying the Uhden 
analysis to an “investigative stop” of a vehicle, and upholding an investigative stop of a vehicle 
that drove on the roadway shoulder and crossed the fog line four times). 
65. The statute authorizes seizures for:  (1) any felony; (2) a misdemeanor relating to the 
possession of a concealed or dangerous weapon or weapons; (3) burglary or unlawful entry; and 
(4) a violation of any provision relating to possession of marijuana or of narcotic, hallucinogenic, 
depressant, or stimulant drugs. N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-29-21 (2009). 
66. Id. 
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Dakota Supreme Court, without mentioning the statute, repeatedly allowed 
stops based on reasonable suspicion for offenses not listed in the statute.67  
When the statute was finally argued to the court in City of Bismarck v. 
Uhden, the court refused to apply the statutory limitation.68  Uhden in-
volved a roadblock stop,69 so why reasonable suspicion was even at issue is 
not clear.  Nonetheless, the court read the apparently clear legislative limits 
as no limits at all, but rather only legislative examples of crimes for which 
investigative stops are permitted.70  Uhden and subsequent cases show that 
our court generally will not limit the police in any significant way regarding 
bases for reasonable suspicion stops71—even for parking violations.72 
Accordingly, assume that instead of being sober, our introductory 
hypothetical driver was found to be drunk, convicted of drunk driving, and 
on appeal contested the parking permit-obstructed vision stop.  It is fair to 
 
67. E.g,. State v. Smith, 452 N.W.2d 86, 88-90 (N.D. 1990) (holding the presence of a beer 
bottle taken off the top of a car by a person standing next to the car created reasonable suspicion 
of an open-bottle violation); State v. Beyer, 441 N.W.2d 919, 922-23 (N.D. 1989) (concluding a 
police officer had a reasonable and articulable suspicion warranting an investigatory stop of a 
vehicle when it was “making excessive or unusual noise in violation of the law”); State v. 
Goeman, 431 N.W.2d 290, 291-92 (N.D. 1988) (holding a stop was justified where the car came 
to an abrupt halt at an intersection and the car later weaved within its own lane); Neset v. North 
Dakota Highway Comm’r, 388 N.W.2d 860, 862-63 (N.D. 1986) (concluding a stop was justified 
where the driver weaved “from side to side in its own lane of travel and . . . failed to signal for a 
right-hand turn”); State v. Dorendorf, 359 N.W.2d 115, 117 (N.D. 1984) (stating a vehicle’s 
weaving within its own lane may be enough to justify the stop of that vehicle). 
68. City of Bismarck v. Uhden, 513 N.W.2d 373, 376 (N.D. 1994). 
69. Id. at 374. 
70. Id. at 376. 
71. State v. Loh, 2000 ND 188, ¶ 14, 618 N.W.2d 477, 480 (concluding the officer had not 
only reasonable suspicion, but also probable cause for a traffic stop when he observed a vehicle 
weaving and crossing lane lines); Kappel v. Director, N.D. Dep’t of Transp., 1999 ND 213, ¶ 12, 
602 N.W.2d 718, 721 (holding police had reasonable suspicion to make an investigative stop 
based on observing a motorcycle pause longer than normal at a stop sign and then watching it 
weave within its own lane); Johnson v. North Dakota Dep’t of Transp., 530 N.W.2d 359, 361 
(N.D. 1995) (declining to hold unreasonable, as a matter of law, an officer following a suspect 
driver for nearly five miles before stopping the vehicle); State v. Hawley, 540 N.W.2d 390 (N.D. 
1995) (permitting an investigative seizure for a possible parking violation resulting from a car 
parked on an off-ramp); Wolf v. North Dakota Dep’t of Transp., 523 N.W.2d 545, 547 (N.D.1994) 
(declining to hold unreasonable, as a matter of law, an officer following a suspect driver for nearly 
five miles before stopping the vehicle).  But see Johnson v. Sprynczynatyk, 2006 ND 137, ¶ 15, 
717 N.W.2d 586, 590 (traveling eight to ten miles per hour in a twenty-five mile per hour zone 
does not constitute reasonable and articulable suspicion to support a stop); Salter v. N.D. Dep’t of 
Transp., 505 N.W.2d 111, 114 (N.D. 1993) (holding police did not have reasonable and articulable 
suspicion to stop a car traveling 30 to 35 miles per hour in a 50 mile per hour zone even though 
the car was weaving slightly within its own lane); State v. Brown, 509 N.W.2d 69, 71 (N.D. 1993) 
(holding evidence that a driver is traveling at a slower than usual speed does not create reasonable 
and articulable suspicion). 
72. See State v. Hawley, 540 N.W.2d 390, 393 (N.D. 1995) (holding reasonable suspicion 
justified investigation of illegal parking); see also State v. Leher, 2002 ND 171, ¶ 1, 653 N.W.2d 
56, 58 (stating if the defendant “was parked on an elevated structure,” committing a parking 
violation, “then the arresting officer had reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal 
activity”) (emphasis added). 
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assume that the North Dakota Supreme Court would be unlikely to suppress 
evidence and let the guilty criminal go free.  Our point is that an abstract 
and plain reading of either the reasonable suspicion stop statute or the 
windshield obstruction statute would yield a result that limits police 
authority to serious crimes and serious windshield obstructions.  However, 
expecting an appellate court faced with a guilty defendant asking for a 
ruling that will restrict the activity of police in all cases to protect the many 
citizens not guilty of crime is unrealistic.  Thus, in Part IV, we propose 
legislation to provide modest protection to North Dakota motorists.73  But 
first, in Part III, we consider the status quo as it affects the police. 
III. VEHICLE STOPS FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF THE POLICE 
The stops with which we are concerned here are routinely held to be 
seizures under the Fourth Amendment.  Thus, they require either probable 
cause or, as our court held in Uhden, merely reasonable suspicion.  But 
what is the difference between the two standards?  One can read countless 
court opinions, legal treatises, and journal articles, and still find it difficult 
to distinguish probable cause from reasonable suspicion.74  As discussed 
above, the authors have a longstanding disagreement about the distinction.75  
 
73. See William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 HARV. L. REV. 
780, 832 (2006).  Stuntz agrees that relying on judicial regulation of police via constitutional law 
is the wrong approach, and goes much further than our modest legislative proposal: 
For these reasons [protection that favors the rich and the evils and limits of the 
exclusionary rule], the best thing to do with the massive body of Fourth Amendment 
privacy regulation, together with the equally massive body of law on the scope and 
limits of the exclusionary rule, is to wipe it off the books.  Let states experiment with 
different regulatory regimes.  Some will protect privacy more than others, just as some 
offer more environmental protection or better public schools than others.  Voters will 
decide what tradeoffs they prefer. 
Id.  A cynic might suggest that Uhden shows the futility of legislation in the face of a strained 
interpretation by a result-oriented court.  We hope our proposed legislation will send a clearer 
direction to the police and courts and will not be circumvented by them. 
74. To distinguish the standards, Professor LaFave’s five volume treatise on search and 
seizure is a good place to begin.  LaFave devotes over 400 pages to Chapter 3, “Probable Cause,” 
145 pages to § 9.5, “Grounds for a Permissible Stop,” and another 8 pages to § 9.3(a) on “Routine 
Traffic Stops Distinguished.”  See generally LAFAVE, supra note 18.  Two of the best articles 
discussing the levels of certainty required by probable cause and reasonable suspicion are:  
C.M.A. McCauliff, Burdens of Proof: Degrees of Belief, Quanta of Evidence, or Constitutional 
Guarantees?, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1293 (1982), and Bacigal, supra note 60.  McCauliff surveyed 
166 federal judges who specified, with wide variation, an average level of certainty of 44.52% for 
probable cause (ranging from 10% to 90%). McCauliff, supra at 1327-28.  One hundred sixty-four 
judges specified an average level of certainty of 29.59% for reasonable suspicion—ranging from 
0% to 100%—showing that some federal judges had no clue, as further evidenced by one judge 
responding to her survey question about reasonable suspicion with, “never heard of that one.” Id.  
McCauliff’s survey also regarded the terminology “reasonable cause,” and, even though the 
United States Supreme Court has equated it with probable cause, the surveyed judges’ average 
ascribed percentage of certainty was 40.73%. Id. at 1327. 
75. See infra Part I. 
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The important point, for the purpose of this article and the reality on the 
road, is what the police make of the distinction.  A police officer’s decision 
in the field is “guided” by unclear concepts.  So, to avoid an unduly long 
rehash of all the material available to lawyers and judges, we imagine a 
realistic exchange between police officers and a lawyer76 trying to help the 
officer understand the relevant considerations in North Dakota. 
Assume an in-service training session with a group of officers who 
want to better understand the required bases for traffic stops.  The following 
dialogue shows in a practical way that the police, if they understand the 
law, will be able to stop virtually any driver.77  In addition, by lowering the 
required basis for the stop from probable cause to the reasonable suspicion 
standard, more people, most of them innocent of any crime, will be stopped 
and subjected to investigation for crimes absent any reasonable suspicion. 
Trainer 
As you already know from the academy and your previous training, 
probable cause is required to make an arrest.  A lesser standard, called 
reasonable suspicion,78 is enough to make a so-called Terry investigative 
stop. 
The difficulty of quantifying evidentiary standards like reasonable 
suspicion and probable cause is quite evident.  Probable cause is “an 
exceedingly difficult concept to objectify.”79  The same can be said for the 
reasonable suspicion standard.  Indeed, part of the problem is that the courts 
 
76. The authors have conducted numerous training seminars for law enforcement officers.  
The dialogue we hypothesize between a lawyer and police officer is intended to illustrate the 
difficulty of explaining legal concepts to the police in a clear and objective way—and, of course, 
to demonstrate an exhaustive list of violations providing bases for stops. 
77. See Harris, supra note 13, at 574-76 (providing a pithy description of how a legally astute 
officer might characterize the power afforded by the courts).  His hypothetical officer concludes: 
So, if you’re out there in a car and we think you’re dirty, forget it.  If we want you, 
we’ll get you, and we’ll find whatever you’ve got, one way or another.  It’s like they 
used to say about the Mounties—we always get our man.  And the best part is, we 
always follow the law while we do it.  That’s no problem at all. 
Id. at 576. 
78. The term “reasonable suspicion” is also referred to as “reasonable and articulable 
suspicion” or “particularized and objective basis.”  See, e.g., United States v. Botero-Ospina, 71 
F.3d 783, 787 (10th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (stating “[a] traffic stop is valid under the Fourth 
Amendment if the stop is based on an observed traffic violation or if the police officer has 
reasonable articulable suspicion that a traffic or equipment violation has occurred or is 
occurring”); see also United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981) (defining reasonable 
suspicion as “a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of 
criminal activity”).  Many courts apply this low level of proof to “routine traffic stops.”  See, e.g., 
United States v. Holt, 264 F.3d 1215, 1220 (10th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (“We have consistently 
applied the principles of Terry v. Ohio to routine traffic stops.”) (citation omitted). 
79. 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 3.2(a), at 22 (3d ed. 1996) (quoting 
Joseph G. Cook, Probable Cause to Arrest, 24 VAND. L. REV. 317, 317 (1971)). 
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consistently refuse to quantify the standards.  Without quantification, a 
standard is hard to “objectify.” 
Instead, we get statements like this from the United States Supreme 
Court:  Probable cause exists for the police when “the facts and 
circumstances within their knowledge and of which they have reasonably 
trustworthy information [are] sufficient to warrant a prudent man in 
believing that the [suspect] had committed or was committing an offense.”80  
According to Terry, reasonable suspicion exists when an officer has “speci-
fic and articulable facts” leading to a reasonable belief that “criminal activ-
ity is afoot.”81  The United States Supreme Court has made it clear that rea-
sonable suspicion requires less certainty than probable cause that the person 
stopped is an offender.  However, because the Supreme Court refuses to 
quantify both standards, how much less is neither quantified nor clear. 
Our own North Dakota Supreme Court is no more helpful.  It often 
quotes from United States Supreme Court decisions, like Illinois v. Gates.82  
In Kappel v. Director, North Dakota Department of Transportation,83 the 
North Dakota Supreme Court said: 
[P]robable cause requires only a probability or substantial chance 
of criminal activity, not an actual showing of such activity.  By 
hypothesis, therefore, innocent behavior frequently will provide 
the basis for a showing of probable cause; to require otherwise 
would be to sub silentio impose a drastically more rigorous 
definition of probable cause than the security of our citizens’ 
demands . . . .  In making a determination of probable cause the 
relevant inquiry is not whether particular conduct is “innocent” or 
“guilty,” but the degree of suspicion that attaches to particular 
types of noncriminal acts.84 
The court went on to explain, “This principle applies equally well to 
the reasonable suspicion standard.”85  In State v. Washington,86 the North 
Dakota Supreme Court observed that:  “[I]nvestigative stops of automobiles 
 
80. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964).  See also Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 
174-76 (1949). 
81. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 30 (1968).  “A piece of trivia:  The Court did not use the 
term ‘reasonable suspicion’ in Terry . . . .”  DRESSLER & MICHAELS, supra note 60, at 285 n.29.  
Nonetheless, we, as do Dressler, Michaels, and most others, refer to the “‘reasonable suspicion’ 
standard applied in Terry”. Id. at 285. 
82. 462 U.S. 213 (1983). 
83. 1999 ND 213, ¶ 9, 602 N.W.2d 718, 720-21 (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 244 
n.13 (1983)). 
84. Id. 
85. Kappel, ¶ 9, 602 N.W.2d at 721 (citing United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 10 (1989)). 
86. 2007 ND 138, ¶ 11, 737 N.W.2d 382, 386-87 (citations omitted). 
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and their occupants for suspected violations of law may be upheld if an 
officer has at least a reasonable suspicion that the motorist has violated the 
law or probable cause to believe the motorist has done so.”87 
Reasonable suspicion requires more than a mere hunch.  
Reasonable suspicion for a stop exists when a reasonable person in 
the officer’s position would be justified by some objective 
manifestation to suspect potential unlawful activity.  The reason-
able suspicion standard is objective and does not hinge upon the 
subjective beliefs or motivations of the arresting officer.  In order 
to determine whether an investigative stop is valid, we consider 
the totality of the circumstances and examine the information 
known to the officer at the time of the stop.  The reasonable 
suspicion standard does not require an officer to rule out every 
possible innocent excuse for the behavior in question before 
stopping a vehicle for investigation.88 
As you can see, then, the language of the courts is not particularly clear 
or helpful.  In fact, the language is of little or no help in distinguishing 
probable cause from reasonable suspicion. 
Officer 
So the courts tell us that we have probable cause when we have 
information sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the suspect 
had committed or was committing an offense.  We have reasonable suspi-
cion when we are reasonably justified by some objective manifestation to 
suspect the defendant was, or was about to be, engaged in unlawful activity.  
How are they different?  They both seem to boil down to “being 
reasonable.”  Are there levels of reasonableness? 
Trainer 
Let us try it this way:  to make better sense of various standards, we 
could think of levels of proof or certainty as a percentage of likelihood of 
being correct.  In other words, we can create a relative continuum of 
certainty.  An omniscient god would be one hundred percent certain of 
everything.  In criminal trials, the defendant must be found guilty by jurors 
who are certain of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, which is the highest 
standard required in our legal system.  Courts also refuse to quantify this 
standard, and have problems articulating and instructing juries on its mean-
ing.  For purposes of comparison, assume that proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt requires a jury to be at least ninety percent certain that the defendant 
 
87. Washington, 2007 ND 138, ¶ 11, 737 N.W.2d at 387. 
88. Id. (citations omitted) (quoting State v. Westmiller, 2007 ND 52, 730 N.W.2d 134). 
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is guilty.  In civil cases, the plaintiff must prove the case by a prepon-
derance of evidence.  That means the evidence favors the plaintiff or, quan-
titatively, that it is at least more likely than not—more than fifty percent—
that the case is proven.  Preponderance of the evidence is the only level of 
certainty that is to some extent quantified by the courts, albeit primarily by 
the metaphor of the scales of justice tipping slightly in favor of a plaintiff. 
Probable cause is most often held to be less than the fifty percent 
certainty of preponderance, although the United States Supreme Court has 
never held so directly.89  Let us assume, for purposes of comparison, that 
probable cause requires a level of certainty of at least forty percent.90  
Where then does reasonable suspicion fall as a level of certainty?  Reason-
able suspicion is said to be less than probable cause but more than a mere 
hunch, although again the courts avoid quantification.  So, to flesh out our 
continuum, assume a mere hunch is at best twenty percent certainty.  A 
mere hunch of rain tomorrow therefore means rain is at best twenty percent 
likely.  Where then does reasonable suspicion fit?  In our arbitrary assign-
ment of relative levels of certainty, it would be less than 40%, but more 
than 20% certainty—something around, let us say, 30%.91 
Again, the courts refuse to speak in such quantitative terms.  Therefore, 
the best we can say is that reasonable suspicion is more than a mere hunch, 
but less than probable cause.  Or, as the North Dakota Supreme Court has 
expressed it, “The reasonable suspicion standard is less stringent than 
probable cause.”92 
Although the language of the courts does not help much, our contin-
uum of certainty helps us visualize the differences.  Beyond that, nothing 
but examples from published case opinions can help.  But even there, 
reasonable judges, lawyers, police officers, and even law professors, often 
disagree.93 
Officer 
Well, what is required for a car stop for a traffic offense anyway:  
probable cause or reasonable suspicion? 
 
89. LAFAVE, supra note 18, § 3.2(e), at 69. 
90. See McCauliff, supra note 74, at 1332.  Federal judges surveyed on their understanding 
of the minimal level of certainty required to meet the probable cause standard averaged 
approximately forty percent as the level of certainty. Id. 
91. Id. (finding federal judges, on average, estimate the level of certainty for reasonable 
suspicion as approximately thirty percent). 
92. State v. Corum, 2003 ND 89, ¶ 10, 663 N.W.2d 151, 155. 
93. See supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text (describing the authors’ and the LaFave-
Slobogin disagreement). 
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Trainer 
Most of the time, when you observe a traffic offender, the offense is 
being committed in your sight, and when you stop the offending car and 
driver, you have what you need for both a stop and a conviction.  Let’s take 
running a stop sign for example.  You see the person go through an inter-
section, past a stop sign, without coming close to stopping.  If the offender 
asks for a hearing, you will basically describe what you saw and the basis 
for your stop.  If the judge is convinced that it is more likely than not that 
you saw the defendant go through the stop sign, you have proven the 
offense by the required preponderance of evidence,94 which is a standard 
greater than probable cause and reasonable suspicion.  So, your stop was 
valid under either standard.  For any stop of this sort, you have at least 
probable cause and need not worry about the lower standard of reasonable 
suspicion. 
The United States Supreme Court has never directly held that inves-
tigative stops based on reasonable suspicion are permitted for minor crimes, 
much less noncriminal traffic offenses.95  But the North Dakota Supreme 
Court has allowed reasonable suspicion stops for many years, even for 
noncriminal traffic offenses.  So, until the North Dakota Supreme Court 
changes its mind, or unless a federal court with jurisdiction over North 
Dakota determines investigative stops are not permitted for minor traffic 
offenses, as some experts argue they should,96 you may stop anybody in 
North Dakota based on reasonable suspicion of even the most trivial traffic 
violation. 
Officer 
Are there any statutes that provide limits on traffic stops? 
Trainer 
Even though minimal certainty is required for a stop, there are 
legislative limits restricting police authority for some traffic violations.  The 
clearest example is a statute that prohibits custodial arrests for most 
noncriminal traffic offenses.97  Another example is North Dakota’s seatbelt 
 
94. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-06.1-03(6) (2009) (providing the government “must prove 
the commission of a charged violation at the hearing . . . by a fair preponderance of the 
evidence”). 
95. LAFAVE, supra note 18, § 9.3(a), at 361. 
96. Id.; see also Moran, supra note 58, at 1155-57; Lockney, supra note 21, at 974-83. 
97. § 39-07-07.  See also Thomas M. Lockney & Mark Friese, Atwater in North Dakota:  
Soccer Moms Beware, Sometimes, 78 N.D. L. REV. 467, 467-78 (2002) (discussing exceptions to 
the general rule prohibiting custodial arrests for noncriminal traffic offenses). 
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statute, which may prohibit stops based solely on a seatbelt violation.98  But 
whether the statute prohibits officers from stopping unbelted motorists is 
questionable.99  There are other limits as well.  For example, it is unlawful 
to drive in North Dakota without a driver’s license in possession.100  But 
someone cited for this violation can make the ticket go away by producing 
his license at the police station or in court.101  These and other provisions102 
are perhaps legislative indications that some offenses are probably not 
important enough to justify normal criminal—or even normal traffic 
citation—procedures. 
Officer 
Why do we need reasonable suspicion if most of the time we will see 
an offense and have probable cause? 
Trainer 
Most traffic stops do indeed involve the observation of an offense: 
running a red light or stop sign, speeding, and the like.  There are, however, 
numerous circumstances where an officer may believe a violation is occur-
ring, for which further investigation will confirm or dispel the officer’s 
suspicion.  It is more likely that stops for this type of violation will be 
evaluated under the reasonable suspicion standard. 
 
98. See § 39-21-41.5 (providing, “A peace officer may not issue a citation for a violation of 
section 39-21-41.4 [the seatbelt provision] unless the officer lawfully stopped or detained the 
driver of the motor vehicle for another violation”). 
99. The controlling language of the secondary enforcement statute states “an officer may not 
issue a citation” for a seatbelt violation unless the driver was “stopped or detained . . . for another 
violation.” Id.  The statute does not say “an officer may not stop a driver for violating the seatbelt 
provision.”  Here, again, semantics come into play.  Imagine the enterprising officer who stops a 
violator for not wearing a seatbelt, while never intending to issue a citation—because the statute 
forbids issuance of a citation.  Like many of these stories, the officer sees contraband in plain 
view.  The officer issues a warning ticket, not a citation, for the seatbelt offense and arrests the 
driver for possession of contraband.  Is the contraband “fruit of a poisonous stop,” or does the 
enterprising prosecutor alert the court that the statute says “no ticket” and not “no stop?”  This 
case has not presented itself in a reported opinion, but experience suggests it has occurred.  
Moreover, consistent with the rationale of Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164 (2008), it is quite 
possible that the remedy would not be exclusion of the evidence.  In Moore, the United States 
Supreme Court held evidence is admissible under the Fourth Amendment even though the 
evidence is obtained in a search incident to an arrest that, according to state statute, was unlawful. 
Id. at 178. 
100. § 39-06-16. 
101. Id. 
102. § 39-08-20(2) (providing a driver who cannot produce satisfactory proof of having 
liability insurance may be charged with operating a vehicle without insurance if the driver fails “to 
submit satisfactory evidence of the policy to the officer or the officer’s agency within twenty days 
from the date of the request”). 
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Officer 
But if in most cases there is already probable cause, why would the 
North Dakota Supreme Court allow and apply a lower standard of reason-
able suspicion? 
Trainer 
That’s a good question, and I’m not sure I know the answer.  Requiring 
probable cause would not be extraordinary, and likely would not greatly 
reduce the number of traffic stops because, as you note, in most cases the 
officer has probable cause.  Courts that allow reasonable suspicion as the 
basis for routine traffic stops seem reluctant to limit, in any significant way, 
the power of the police.  Why?  Because, when a court is asked to create 
limits, the context is almost invariably a guilty criminal.103  A defense 
victory results in a new trial or, if the evidence suppressed is essential to a 
conviction, a dismissal and total victory for the guilty criminal.  Is it any 
wonder then that judges, especially elected judges, many with prosecutorial 
backgrounds, strain to rule in favor of the prosecution—“the good guys”—
and against the convicted criminal—a “bad guy?” 
Translation for you, the police:  “We want you to catch as many crimi-
nals as possible.  You do not need probable cause, an observed crime, or 
even a noncriminal offense.  If you even suspect an offense, however trivial 
or minor—stop the car.  Maybe you will get lucky and find a drunk driver 
or drug courier.” 
Officer 
If we properly stop a car, do the courts limit what we can do during the 
stop? 
Trainer 
Although one legal scholar has remarked that after a traffic stop “things 
get ugly,” from your perspective in trying to catch criminals, things actually 
get easy.104  Drunk drivers will provide you the odor of alcohol, slurred 
 
103. See supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
104. LAFAVE, supra note 18, § 9.3(a), at 358.  Professor LaFave notes: 
In recent years more Fourth Amendment battles have been fought about police activi-
ties incident to a stopping for a traffic infraction, what the courts call a “routine traffic 
stop,” than in any other context.  There is a reason why this is so, and it is not that 
police have taken an intense interest in such matters as burned-out taillights and 
unsignaled lane changes per se.  Rather, the renewed interest of the police in traffic 
enforcement is attributable to a federally-sponsored initiative related to the “war on 
drugs.”  Both in urban areas and on the interstates, police are on the watch for “suspi-
cious” travelers, and when a modicum of supposedly suspicious circumstances are 
observed—or, perhaps, even on a hunch or pursuant to such arbitrary considerations as 
the color of the driver’s skin—it is only a matter of time before some technical or 
trivial offense produces the necessary excuse for a traffic stop.  Perhaps because the 
offenses are often so insignificant, the driver may be told at the outset that he will 
merely be given a warning.  But then things get ugly.  As part of the “routine,” a 
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speech, and glassy, bloodshot eyes.  Sometimes you will detect the odor of 
drugs, or maybe even see them in plain view.  You may run a drug-sniffing 
dog around the car and ask for permission to search, if you do not unduly 
extend the time of the stop.105  If you have reasonable suspicion to believe 
you may be in danger, you may do a protective search of the car.  You may 
remove the driver and passengers for no reason.  You may order the driver 
or passengers to be seated in the back of your patrol car.  You can check 
driver’s license and registration status, insurance information, and criminal 
history information.  You can question the driver and passengers about their 
travels.  In short, you have very broad authority to investigate not only the 
violation, but possible criminal activity. 
And, of course, if you develop probable cause to believe the car con-
tains contraband, you may search the car—including locked containers 
inside—without a warrant, under the automobile exception.106  If you 
develop probable cause to arrest the driver or a passenger, you may search 
the passenger compartment under the search incident to arrest doctrine.107 
The actual or subjective reason a particular motorist is subjected to 
additional investigation—like the decision to stop—is generally unques-
tioned by the courts.108  Ambiguous factors like nervousness, lack of details 
regarding travel plans, use of a rental vehicle, inability to promptly locate a 
vehicle registration, and others can be used to justify a longer seizure, 
search of the passengers, or a search of the vehicle itself.  Someone engaged 
in criminal behavior might well be nervous.  The typical motorist—stopped 
by an armed and uniformed police officer, and subjected to a series of 
 
criminal history and outstanding warrants records check is run on the driver and 
passengers; they are closely questioned about their identities, the reason for their 
travels, their intended destinations, and the like, and may be quizzed as to whether 
they have drugs on their persons or in the vehicle.  The driver may be induced to 
submit to a full search of the vehicle, or a drug-sniffing dog may appear on the scene 
and “do his thing.” 
Id. 
105. See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 408 (2005) (holding the practice of using dogs to 
sniff the exterior of a car does not constitute a search, subject to the Fourth Amendment).  But see 
State v. Fields, 2003 ND 81, ¶ 21, 662 N.W.2d 242, 249 (holding a continued seizure occurred 
while awaiting the arrival of a drug-sniffing dog, in violation of the Fourth Amendment). 
106. See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580 (1991) (expanding the scope of warrant-
less automobile searches to locked containers within the vehicle); Carroll v. United States, 267 
U.S. 132, 153, 155 (1925) (permitting warrantless searches of cars upon probable cause to believe 
the cars contain contraband). 
107. See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 457-61 (1981) (authorizing warrantless searches 
of cars incident to the lawful arrest of an occupant); see also Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 
1719 (2009) (holding the search of the defendant’s vehicle while he was handcuffed in a patrol car 
was unreasonable); Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 617 (2004) (applying the Belton rule 
even if the officer does not make contact until after the arrested person has left the vehicle). 
108. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996); State v. Bartelson, 2005 ND 172, 
¶¶ 15-16, 704 N.W.2d 824, 829. 
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questions unrelated to the claimed violation—is undoubtedly equally 
nervous.109  You can use these factors to legally prolong the detention and 
sometimes to search the vehicle and its occupants. 
But, you should exercise caution in moving the motorist from the 
scene,110 or from extending the seizure too long.  The courts have said that 
an investigative detention must be “reasonably related in scope to the cir-
cumstances which justified the interference in the first place.”111  So, if you 
stop a motorist for a traffic violation, courts say it is permissible for you to:  
(1) obtain the driver’s license and registration; (2) have the driver step out 
of the vehicle; (3) require the driver wait in the patrol car; (4) conduct 
computer inquiries to determine the validity of the license and registration 
or to investigate the driver’s criminal history to determine if the driver has 
outstanding warrants; and (5) inquire into the motorist’s destination and 
purpose.112 
If the seizure is extended too long, a court may conclude an officer has 
made a de facto arrest.113  Although the courts have not recognized a bright-
line rule to establish the existence of a de facto arrest, the United States 
Supreme Court has held a detention of twenty minutes or less is likely rea-
sonable.114  Moving a traffic violator from the scene of the stop to further 
investigate whether the driver is impaired is also problematic.115  For 
example, the North Dakota Supreme Court held it was unreasonable to take 
a driver from the scene of a traffic stop to the police department to further 
investigate whether the driver was impaired.116  The court noted that taking 
the driver from the scene of the stop is a much greater personal intrusion 
than conducting field tests at the scene.117 
Officer 
So the reduced standard allows us to stop more cars with less certainty? 
 
109. See, e.g., United States v. Beck, 140 F.3d 1129, 1139 (8th Cir. 1998) (citing United 
States v. Wood, 106 F.3d 942, 947 (10th Cir. 1997)) (noting it is not uncommon for most citizens, 
whether innocent or guilty, to exhibit signs of nervousness when confronted by law enforcement 
officers). 
110. Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1719 (holding the search of the defendant’s vehicle while he was 
handcuffed in a patrol car was unreasonable); see also City of Devils Lake v. Grove, 2008 ND 
155, ¶ 1, 755 N.W.2d 485 (holding an officer’s transport of a motorist away from the scene of a 
stop constituted an impermissible de facto arrest). 
111. State v. Fields, 2003 ND 81, ¶ 8, 662 N.W.2d 242, 245 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 
1, 20 (1968)). 
112. Fields, ¶ 8, 662 N.W.2d at 245 (citing United States v. Jones, 269 F.3d 919, 924 (8th 
Cir. 2001)). 
113. Grove, 2008 ND 155, ¶ 1, 755 N.W.2d at 488. 
114. United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685 (1985). 
115. See Grove, 2008 ND 155, ¶ 1, 755 N.W.2d at 488. 
116. Id. 
117. Id. ¶ 27, 755 N.W.2d at 494. 
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Trainer 
As we discussed earlier, the court’s language defining probable cause 
and reasonable suspicion is not very helpful.  The courts refuse to quantify 
either standard.  But, the courts frequently remind us that probable cause is 
a “more exacting” standard than reasonable suspicion.118  Even without a 
quantified meaning for both standards, the message is clear:  you can stop 
more cars under the reasonable suspicion standard.  And, as you know from 
your experience, the more cars you stop, the more criminals you will find.  
Occasionally, the courts will find that your suspicion was only “a mere 
hunch.”119  But, if you believe the stop is reasonable, go ahead and stop.  
We can most likely justify the stop in court.120  Moreover, most people will 
not be guilty of a crime, and will not have the opportunity to contest the 
stop.  Of those who are, many will not hire lawyers, so the basis of the stop 
will never be litigated.  For those who hire lawyers, many will be offered 
and will accept plea bargains, so we will get some kind of conviction.  For 
those litigated, judges will bend over backwards to try to find a way to 
make your stop legal, and if they cannot manage that, they will often find 
an exception to the exclusionary rule.  If none of those things work, well, 
you still got a criminal off the street for awhile.  If the evidence is suppres-
sed, or a conviction is reversed, it is a small price to pay for the deterrent 
value of stopping as many people as possible.  The more people you stop, 
the more criminals we find.  The innocent people stopped will be happy 
they only received a warning or an inexpensive fine. 
Officer 
Can you provide a few examples from the traffic code of stops based 
on probable cause or reasonable suspicion? 
 
118. State v. Smith, 2005 ND 21, ¶ 16, 691 N.W.2d 203, 209 (quoting City of Minot v. 
Nelson, 462 N.W.2d 460, 462 (N.D. 1990)). 
119. See State v. Brown, 509 N.W.2d 69, 71 (N.D. 1993) (stating a seizure “requires less 
than probable cause but more than a mere hunch”). 
120. In 1978, coauthor Lockney, while on sabbatical from the University of North Dakota, 
worked in the University of Texas School of Law’s Criminal Defense Clinic.  Lockney remembers 
hearing the Clinic Director, Professor Robert Dawson, explain to a criminal procedure class that a 
realistic prosecutor, aware of the complexities of search and seizure law, might reasonably con-
sider advising police to “just do what seems reasonable, and let us worry about the complex rules 
of search and seizure later.  We’ll win most of them, and the few we lose we’ll just chalk up to the 
cost of doing law enforcement business.”  Professor Bacigal more recently made a similar 
observation: 
The inability to formulate clear rules or precise probability levels governing probable 
cause has led the Court to adopt one over-arching rule for the police—just use your 
common sense and act reasonably.  In an imperfect world where correct answers are 
uncertain, a “pragmatic” Court recognizes that it must muddle through to the best of 
its ability, and that it can hardly ask more from the police. 
Bacigal, supra note 60, at 318 (footnotes omitted). 
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Trainer 
I can give you more than a few.  Indeed, I can give you so many that, if 
you are reasonably observant, you should be able to stop anybody you want 
based either on probable cause or reasonable suspicion.  Assume probable 
cause exists when an officer has observed a violation of the traffic code.  
Assume reasonable suspicion, on the other hand, arises when the officer 
believes a traffic violation may have occurred, but further investigation is 
required.121  I will show you how incredibly easy it is to stop somebody, 
precisely because of the myriad of reasons the law gives you.  If you cannot 
remember all the legal reasons I describe, I will give you a list you can 
carry with you in your squad car. 
Let us start with examples that constitute probable cause.  As any 
experienced officer knows, observing a speeding motorist—even for only a 
mile or two over the limit—is completely routine.122  You can safely stop 
any motorist who—by radar or observation—appears to be exceeding the 
posted limit, or who is driving so slow as to impede traffic.123  Likewise, if 
you observe a motorist violate a traffic-control-signal,124 you may lawfully 
stop the driver.  Even if a motorist rushes to beat the light, it is likely that 
you may lawfully stop the motorist for passing through a “pink” signal.125  
North Dakota law requires vehicles proceeding at “less than normal speed 
of traffic at the time and place and under the conditions then existing” to 
drive in the right-hand lane except when passing or preparing for a left hand 
 
121. See supra notes 19-34 and accompanying text.  The authors agree that most traffic 
violations, including those that require “additional investigation,” provide probable cause to stop.  
Because courts refer to “investigative stops,” some form of distinction has to be drawn.  Accord-
ingly, the authors have attempted to draw a distinction in traffic violations by analyzing those 
violations within a typical traffic code in which an officer stops to investigate the existence or 
non-existence of a traffic violation.  Whatever their theoretical differences, it is important to note 
that the distinction was recognized by coauthor Friese when he was making stops as a licensed 
police officer. 
122. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 39-09-01 to -09 (2009).  Interestingly, North Dakota, like many 
states, has a minimum speed limit.  North Dakota’s minimum speed limit is not expressed in quan-
tifiable terms, but rather a person may not drive so slow “as to impede the normal and reasonable 
movement of traffic except when reduced speed is necessary for safe operation or in compliance 
with the law.” § 39-09-09(1). 
123. § 39-09-09(1). 
124. Violations of traffic-control-signals are commonly known as “red light” violations or 
“semaphore violations” in some states. See, e.g., State v. Kilmer, 741 N.W.2d 607, 609 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 2007). 
125. The “pink” terminology is jargon for the motorist who rapidly accelerates to pass 
through a signal changing from yellow to red.  In such circumstances, a driver may not be exercis-
ing due care in the operation of his or her vehicle and may be subject to the “catch-all” care 
required provision. § 39-09-01.1.  But see Kilmer, 741 N.W.2d at 612 (holding Minnesota law 
does not prohibit a driver’s entry into an intersection on a steady yellow traffic light). 
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turn.126  Accordingly, you have authority to stop most “left lane drivers” at 
will.127 
As officers, you know that motorists frequently—and likely unwit-
tingly—violate statutes when making a turn.  For example, a driver must 
signal the intention to turn continuously for a distance of at least one hun-
dred feet;128 a driver must turn from the farthest “practicable” portion of 
either the right or the left side of the roadway, while maintaining the 
appropriate lane.129  Your observations will likely confirm that half or more 
drivers turn improperly.  Moreover, most motorists are unaware that they 
cannot cross a railroad crossing while the control arms are going down or 
up.130  By consciously observing just one railroad crossing controlled by 
crossing gates or barrier arms, you will likely see the first few motorists 
crossing the tracks after the train has passed, and while the barrier arms are 
still in the process of rising. 
It is unlawful to pass a stopped school bus from either direction if the 
bus displays a stop arm or red flashing signals.131  A person may not drive 
with more than three passengers on the vehicle’s front seat if the driver’s 
view is obstructed or if the number of passengers interferes with the 
driver’s control of the vehicle.132  Neither a driver nor a passenger may 
open the door of a motor vehicle unless opening the door is done “safely” 
and only for so long as is “reasonably necessary to load or unload 
passengers.”133  It is unlawful to follow a “fire apparatus” within 500 feet or 
to cross a fire hose.134 
Size, weight, and height restrictions also provide you with plentiful 
reasons to stop vehicles.  Consistent with our analysis of investigative stops 
for traffic violations, this type of violation may more appropriately be 
termed a reasonable suspicion stop because you may have to inspect, weigh, 
or otherwise measure a given load to determine if a violation has actually 
occurred.135 
 
126. § 39-10-08(2). 
127. Id. 
128. § 39-10-38(2). 
129. § 39-10-35(2). 
130. § 39-10-41(2). 
131. § 39-10-46(1). 
132. § 39-10-54. 
133. § 39-10-54.1. 
134. §§ 39-10-57 to -58.  A remarkable number of people will cross a fire hose and police 
officers are often called to fire scenes for the mere purpose of protecting the expensive fire hose. 
135. See generally §§ 39-12-01 to -23 (establishing numerous height, weight, and load 
restrictions for vehicles).  The expansiveness of these provisions becomes technical and broad; a 
detailed summary of these provisions would exceed the scope of this article.  Suffice it to say, 
there are numerous limitations as well as exceptions to vehicles carrying loads. 
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Vehicle equipment violations are exceptionally common.  Headlight 
use is required in North Dakota from sunset to sunrise and when weather 
conditions limit visibility to less than 1000 feet.136  Motor vehicles must 
have at least two headlamps.137  Vehicles, trailers, or any item drawn at the 
end of a train of vehicles must have a tail lamp emitting a red light that is 
plainly visible for at least 1000 feet.138  A tail lamp or separate lamp must 
illuminate, with a white light, the rear license plate at any time headlamps 
or auxiliary driving lamps are lighted.139  This lamp must be bright enough 
to render the rear license plate “clearly legible” from a distance of fifty feet 
to the rear of the vehicle.140  Additionally, vehicles must be equipped with 
reflectors, stop, and turn signals.141 
Numerous color restrictions apply to clearance lamps, side markers, 
and reflectors.142  Violations of these provisions are common with acces-
sorized motor vehicles.143  Between certain hours, parked vehicles must 
have white or amber lights lighted to the front and red lamps visible from 
the rear.144 Additional accessorizing of a vehicle may not exceed two 
auxiliary driving lamps, two auxiliary passing lamps, or two fog lamps.145 
During any shift, you will observe common equipment violations, 
including vehicle mufflers that are not in good working order, causing 
“excessive or unusual” noise or annoying smoke.146  Vehicles must be 
equipped with a rear-view mirror allowing a rearward view of at least 200 
feet.147  All motor vehicles must have a windshield, which must be 
 
136. § 39-21-01.  Farm implements, however, need not display headlamps until one half hour 
after sunset to one half hour before sunrise. § 39-21-01(1). 
137. § 39-21-03(1).  In Wheeling v. Director, N.D. Dep’t of Transp., a headlight violation 
provided “not only reasonable articulable suspicion, but also probable cause for a stop.” 1997 ND 
193, ¶ 6, 569 N.W.2d 273, 275. 
138. § 39-21-04(1). 
139. § 39-21-04(3). 
140. Id. 
141. §§ 39-21-05 to -06. 
142. § 39-21-09. 
143. See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 713 N.W.2d 64, 66 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006) (syllabus) (noting 
“reasonable, articulable suspicion exists to justify stopping a vehicle displaying any colored light, 
other than permitted by” statute). 
144. § 39-21-14(2). 
145. §§ 39-21-17(2)-(4). 
146. § 39-21-37.  Incredibly, stops do result from excessive engine noise, even if only a 
police officer witnesses the event.  “If a tree falls in the forest, and nobody is there to hear it, does 
it make any sound?  If a car makes excessive noise, and only a police officer hears it, is the peace 
disturbed?  The first question is an enigma, but the second we can answer:  The noise permits an 
investigative stop by the officer.”  Wolf v. N.D. Dep’t of Transp., 523 N.W.3d 545, 547 (N.D. 
1994) (Meschke, J., concurring). 
147. § 39-21-38. 
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unobstructed and equipped with operational wipers.148  Common to the 
northern plains is early morning frost; the inattentive motorist who clears 
only a small portion of her windshield is quite susceptible to violating this 
provision.  Further, in North Dakota, for example, any material affixed to 
the windshield must have at least a seventy percent light transmittance and 
side windows adjacent to the driver must have at least fifty percent light 
transmittance.149  Interestingly, factory automobile windows have approxi-
mately an eighty-two percent light transmittance; therefore almost any 
tinting, however slight, will likely result in a violation.  Oftentimes a simple 
“for sale” sign, or even a large air freshener hanging from a rear-view mir-
ror could be a violation of this section.150  Literally read, the statute permits 
a stop of all motorists who have a rear-view mirror affixed to the vehicle 
windshield.151 
Safety belt use is required for front seat passengers in North Dakota 
and for children ages four to seventeen, regardless of where the child is 
seated.152  Child restraint devices are required for children under four years 
of age.153  Although not recommended because of our “secondary enforce-
ment” law, it is possible that you could lawfully stop a vehicle in which 
adult passengers in the front seat are not using safety belts.154 
 
148. § 39-21-39(1)-(2). 
149. § 39-21-39(4). 
150. See, e.g., United States v. Ramos-Carabollo, 375 F.3d 797, 799 (8th Cir. 2004) (holding 
a vehicle stop proper when a driver had an air freshener hanging from the rear-view mirror); see 
also WIS. ADMIN. CODE [Sec. Trans.] § 305.34(3) (1997) (requiring a vehicle’s windshield must 
not be “excessively cracked or damaged”); United States v. Cashman, 216 F.3d 582, 587 (7th Cir. 
2000) (holding a stop valid when the stop was based solely on a cracked windshield in violation of 
Wisconsin law).  In a similar case, a criminal defendant, for whom an arrest warrant had been 
issued, briefly eluded an officer who was attempting to find him to make an arrest.  United States 
v. Oliver, No. 98-4863, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 22371, at *5 (4th Cir. Sept. 15, 1999).  When 
another officer located the defendant’s car and stopped “him under 46.2-1000, which is a safety 
violation [for the cracked windshield],” the court upheld the stop notwithstanding the argument 
the halting officer might not have observed the cracked windshield before the stop. Id. 
151. Section 39-21-39(4) of the North Dakota Century Code prohibits operating a “motor 
vehicle with any object . . . affixed, or applied on the front windshield.” § 39-21-39(4) (emphasis 
added).  See also supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text (discussing windshield obstructions). 
152. § 39-21-41.4 (2009).  Arguably, a police officer observing an apparently unbuckled 
juvenile passenger would have either reasonable suspicion or probable cause to conduct an 
investigative stop to determine whether a violation has occurred.  See also supra notes 98-99 and 
accompanying text (discussing seatbelt violations). 
153. § 39-21-41.2. 
154. See § 39-21-41.5 (prohibiting the issuance of a citation for a seatbelt violation unless the 
motorist is stopped for another violation); see also supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text 
(noting the statute does not prohibit seizures, but instead prohibits issuance of a citation).  What is 
a court to do about the stop if there is no other traffic violation?  An enterprising or experienced 
officer will likely have observed another reason to justify the stop, but an honest or inexperienced 
cop may simply stop to warn.  Is the stop unreasonable?  Is the resulting evidence excluded from 
trial?  See supra note 45.  Several years ago, when coauthor Friese was serving as a police officer, 
a public interest group provided t-shirts for cops to distribute for seatbelt-using motorists.  The 
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If you remain observant, you will find numerous vehicles with im-
properly displayed license plates and registration tabs.  North Dakota law 
requires that vehicles display license plates on the front and rear of the 
vehicle, with exceptions for motorcycles and apportioned vehicles.155  The 
plates must be “securely fastened,” “displayed horizontally and in an up-
right position,” and must be, as far as reasonably possible, “clear of mud, 
ice, or snow so as to be clearly visible.”156  Further, only one annual 
registration tab or sticker for the current year can be applied to the number 
plate, and it must be displayed “in the area designated by the department [of 
transportation] for the tab or sticker.”157  If you pay attention, you will 
likely find remarkable the large number of motorists who display registra-
tion tabs for numerous years by pasting them in a border fashion around the 
exterior of the license plate; this, again, provides a statutory violation 
warranting a traffic stop.158  In northern climates like ours, it is almost 
certain most vehicles will have at least partially obstructed rear license 
plates from snow or mud lifted from the road surface by the vehicle as it 
travels.  Your ability to stop motorists greatly increases with inclement 
weather.  Many motorists protest the front license plate requirement as 
diminishing the appearance of their car; the usual protest method is simply 
not displaying the front plate and violating the statute.159 
In sum, the litany of potential traffic violations provides enterprising 
police officers an expansive statutory basis for making a lawful stop of a 
motorist based upon probable cause or more.  This litany increases expo-
nentially when “investigative stops” are based upon reasonable suspicion of 
a violation. 
As we have discussed, courts have authorized “investigative stops” 
upon “reasonable suspicion” of a traffic violation.  North Dakota courts are 
not alone in this approach.  Other courts have also held an officer’s belief 
that a traffic violation may occur or may be occurring provides authority to 
 
shirts said something like “the cops caught me . . . wearing a seatbelt.”  The group publicly 
announced that police would be distributing the shirts.  Some citizens reported that they actually 
stopped wearing their seatbelt during the promotion because they did not want to be stopped—on 
their way home from the bar—simply because they were wearing a seatbelt. 
155. § 39-04-11.  Most apportioned vehicles are semi tractors—where the rear plate is 
usually not visible because a trailer is normally attached. 
156. Id. 
157. Id.; see also Bartch v. N.D. Dep’t of Transp., 2007 ND 109, ¶ 1, 743 N.W.2d 109, 110 
(upholding a stop based upon an improper display of an annual registration sticker). 
158. § 39-04-11. 
159. Id.; see also United States v. Smart, 393 F.3d 767, 770 (8th Cir. 2005) (noting it was 
permissible to stop a motorist with only one license plate when state law required two plates); 
United States v. Geelan, 509 F.2d 733, 743-44 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 999 (1975) 
(upholding a stop for one license plate even though the officer was unaware of the vehicle’s state 
of origin and whether the vehicle required two plates). 
       
2010] CONSTITUTIONAL ROADKILL IN THE COURTS 35 
stop.160  Courts allowing investigative stops to determine whether a traffic 
violation may have occurred attempt to ascertain the reasonableness of the 
stop based on the specific facts of each case.161  Here are some examples 
that arguably provide reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigative stop:  
(1) the sound of studded snow tires from a vehicle when such use is out of 
season; (2) a potentially misaligned headlight; (3) a bumper or suspension 
height that appears improper; (4) potentially tinted or obstructed windows; 
(5) a potential violation of the open bottle law;162 (6) an apparently youthful 
driver operating a vehicle without seatbelts; and even, (7) a driver who is 
weaving within her own lane of traffic.163  Under existing case law, 
 
160. Moran, supra note 58, at 1155-57.  Some courts have upheld these types of stops even if 
the officer is mistaken in his or her observation.  See, e.g., United States v. Jenkins, 452 F.3d 207, 
212 (2d Cir. 2006) (noting “because the officers had a reasonable but mistaken belief that the SUV 
lacked license plates, stopping the vehicle was ‘justified at its inception’”). 
161. For example, a trilogy of cases in North Dakota reached varying results on the issue of 
whether an officer’s observation of a temporary registration sticker justified a seizure.  See State v. 
Skarsgard, 2007 ND 160, 739 N.W.2d 786; State v. Johnson, 2006 ND 248, 724 N.W.2d 129; 
State v. Oliver, 2006 ND 241, 724 N.W.2d 114.  These cases were summarized in a fourth 
decision: 
The officer in Oliver stopped the defendant because the defendant’s vehicle had no 
license plates in possible violation of state law.  A temporary registration certificate 
was on the rear window of the vehicle, but was faded.  We held that the “faded tempo-
rary registration certificate with no visible printing was indicative of a temporary certi-
ficate that was more than thirty days old and constituted an objective fact giving the 
officer a right to stop [the defendant] to check its validity.”  The faded tag was an 
indication that a violation had been, and was, occurring. 
. . . 
In Johnson, a highway patrolman initiated a traffic stop of a vehicle that did not have 
license plates but did have a temporary registration certificate in the back window. 
Unlike the faded registration certificate observed by the officer in Oliver, there was 
nothing unusual about the registration certificate in Johnson.  The officer in Johnson 
stopped the vehicle only because he believed many people drive vehicles with 
temporary registration certificates beyond the allowable thirty-day period. Id.  We held 
that the officer’s hunch that the defendant may have been in violation of a vehicle 
registration statute was not enough to authorize the stop.  We reversed the district 
court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to suppress. 
. . . 
 In Skarsgard, an officer stopped a vehicle because it had no license plates or visible 
temporary registration certificate, and the officer recognized the driver as a suspended 
driver from a past call.  We held, “[w]hen a law enforcement officer observes a 
vehicle with no license plates and no viewable registration certificate, the officer has 
reasonable grounds to stop the driver and check if the driver has a valid certificate in 
his possession.” 
City of Grand Forks v. Mitchell, 2008 ND 5, ¶¶ 11-13, 743 N.W.2d 800, 803 (internal citations 
omitted). 
162. State v. Smith, 452 N.W.2d 86, 89-90 (N.D. 1990) (upholding an “investigatory vehicle 
stop” based on reasonable suspicion of a violation of North Dakota Century Code section 39-08-
18 (open bottle law)). 
163. Weaving is a well-recognized indication of impairment.  Nonetheless, weaving can 
result from a variety of other circumstances: lighting or extinguishing a cigarette, adjusting the 
radio volume, distractions, eating while driving, speaking on a cellular telephone, or a host of 
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virtually any possible traffic violation establishes a lawful basis for you to 
conduct an “investigatory seizure.” 
Officer 
I’m a bit confused.  Can you provide us with additional examples in the 
traffic code where an officer can stop a motorist to investigate whether a 
violation may exist? 
Trainer 
Assume you observe a vehicle lighting configuration that appears to 
violate a statute; you would be permitted to conduct an investigative stop.  
The following statutes show the numerous lighting requirements of a 
typical traffic code.  North Dakota law provides vehicle headlights must be 
no more than fifty-four inches and no less than twenty-four inches from the 
ground when measured to the center of the lamp.164  Tail lamps must be 
located not more than seventy-two inches and not less than fifteen inches 
from the ground to the center of the lamp.165  No more than two fog lamps 
are permitted; they must be mounted between twelve and thirty inches from 
the ground and cannot project light left of the center of the vehicle at a 
distance of greater than twenty-five feet.166 
Auxiliary passing lamps may not exceed two, must be mounted 
between twenty-four and forty-two inches from the ground, and may have a 
limited use if in specific combination with other lamps.167  Auxiliary driv-
ing lamps may not exceed two, must be mounted between sixteen and forty-
two inches from the ground, and may not be used if in specific combination 
with other lamps.168  Vehicle-road lighting equipment is subject to specific 
light distribution and light beam composition requirements.169 
Interestingly, a person cited with improper lighting equipment may 
avoid the penalty by fixing the equipment within forty-eight hours after the 
 
other reasons.  In North Dakota, the court has provided limits for stops predicated on “weaving.”  
Erratic weaving is sufficient to stop, but if the weaving is “slight,” a stop is not permitted.  Salter 
v. Director, N.D. Dep’t of Transp., 505 N.W.2d 111, 114 (N.D.1993). 
164. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 39-21-02(2), -03(2) (2009). 
165. §§ 39-21-02(2), -04(2). 
166. § 39-21-17(2). 
167. § 39-21-17(3). 
168. § 39-21-17(4). 
169. See generally §§ 39-21-20 to -31 (providing numerous requirements for proper vehicle 
lighting).  For example, high intensity composite beams (the uppermost distribution of light) must 
be aimed so as to reveal persons and vehicles at a distance of at least 450 feet for multi-beam 
lights.  § 39-21-20(1).  Lowermost distribution of the composite beam for multi-beam lights must 
reveal persons and vehicles at 150 feet ahead of the vehicle.  § 39-21-20(2).  Similar provisions 
exist for single beam road lighting equipment.  § 39-21-22.  Further, lamps exceeding 300 candle-
power must be appropriately adjusted so the high intensity portion of the beam will not “strike the 
level of the roadway on which a vehicle stands at a distance of more than seventy-five feet.”  § 39-
21-26(1). 
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ticket is issued.170  This is an apparent legislative acknowledgement that 
lighting equipment may be unknowingly misaligned.  While a law enforce-
ment officer trained in observing misaligned headlights could likely estab-
lish reasonable suspicion to conduct further investigation, most motorists 
are likely oblivious to a potential violation.  None of this, however, would 
likely limit your ability to lawfully stop the motorist.171 
Motor vehicles must have a rear-view mirror reflecting a view of the 
highway of at least 200 feet.172  While most of you presumably would not 
conduct an “investigative stop” to measure the reflectivity of a rear-view 
mirror, the complete absence of a rear-view would likely provide not only 
reasonable suspicion, but also probable cause of a violation.173 
As mentioned earlier, an obstructed windshield, or an obstruction on 
the side windows adjacent to the driver, may provide probable cause to stop 
a motorist.174  But this type of violation may also create a basis for an inves-
tigative stop, particularly if the officer detected tinting that would require 
quantitative measuring to determine the level of light transmittance.175 
Studded snow tires are permitted in North Dakota between October 
15th and April 15th of each year.176  Police officers know it is virtually 
impossible to actually see the studs on the tires of a moving vehicle.  
However, the sound of studded tires on dry pavement is readily discernible 
to the trained ear.  Again, you may believe a violation is occurring, but an 
investigative stop may establish the violation.  Or, upon further investiga-
tion, you may discover the vehicle had driven through a nail factory. 
Officer 
Are there traffic laws that give us particularly broad ability to stop and 
investigate? 
Trainer 
Yes.  Perhaps the most unique, and undoubtedly the most obscure, 
provisions of the North Dakota traffic code do not exist in the traffic code 
itself.  Under a specific provision of the traffic code, entitled Modification 
 
170. § 39-21-24. 
171. See supra note 160. 
172. § 39-21-38. 
173. See supra note 137 (citing Wheeling v. Director, N.D. Dep’t of Transp., 1997 ND 193, 
¶ 6, 569 N.W.2d 273, 275) (noting minor traffic violations provide not only reasonable suspicion, 
but also probable cause for a stop). 
174. § 39-21-39. 
175. Id.  Many officers and police agencies in states that disallow window tinting have “tint 
meters” which measure the light transmittance of windshields or side windows.  The meter is a 
simple, handheld electronic device that measures the light transmittance and provides a numerical 
readout of the actual percentage of light transmittance. 
176. § 39-21-40(3). 
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of a Motor Vehicle,177 a person altering a vehicle—in virtually any man-
ner—must conform to administrative rules promulgated by the Director of 
the Department of Transportation.178  Under this provision of the traffic 
code, a person modifying a vehicle has the burden of proving the 
modification complies with the rules promulgated by the Director.179  The 
modified vehicle statute has enumerated violations,180 but most of the 
prohibited modifications are “hidden,” requiring reference to article 52-04 
of the North Dakota Administrative Code.  Some “hidden” examples 
include operational door handles and latches for any door leading directly 
into the passenger compartment.181  Front opening hoods must have a 
primary and secondary hood latch to hold the hood in a closed position.182  
Steering wheels must have an outside diameter of no less than thirteen 
inches.183  And, contrary to the aforementioned rear-view mirror require-
ment,184 modified, or “special,” motor vehicles must have two rear-view 
mirrors affording a 200 foot view of the rear road surface, and the mirrors 
must have a minimum of ten square inches of reflective surface.185 
The Director also has promulgated additional brake and exhaust 
regulations.186  Fenders must cover the entire width of the tire tread and 
must be “at least fifteen degrees in front to at least seventy-five degrees to 
the rear of the vertical centerline of each wheel measured from the center of 
wheel rotation.”187  No part of a tire may come into contact with the body, 
fender, or chassis of the vehicle.188 
Steering and suspension provisions require that no part of the vehicle, 
except the tires or electric grounding devices, shall extend below the lowest 
part of a wheel rim.189  The steering system must remain unobstructed 
“when turned from lock to lock;” the steering wheel cannot have less then 
 
177. § 39-21-45.1. 
178. Id. 
179. § 39-21-45.1(5). 
180. Id.  Listed modification requirements include:  (1) front and rear bumpers are required; 
(2) maximum body height of forty-two inches; (3) maximum bumper height of twenty-seven 
inches; (4) maximum outside diameter of tires of forty-four inches; and (5) maximum suspension 
lift of four inches.  §§ 39-21-45.1(1)-(4). 
181. N.D. ADMIN. CODE § 52-04-02-01 (2009). 
182. § 52-04-02-03. 
183. § 52-04-02-04. 
184. See supra note 147. 
185. § 52-04-02-05. 
186. §§ 52-04-03-01, -03. 
187. § 52-04-03-04. 
188. Id. 
189. § 52-04-03-06. 
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two turns or more than six turns from “lock to lock.”190  Release of the 
steering wheel between five and fifteen miles per hour “shall result in a 
distinct tendency for the vehicle to increase its turning radius.”191  No less 
than thirty percent of the gross vehicle weight shall be allocated to any 
axle.192 
Further, front tires must measure a minimum of sixty percent of the 
tread width of the rear tires.193  Local enforcement officers have developed 
a comparison chart to expedite calculations regarding enforcement of this 
provision, and the chart and tape measures for verifying violations are often 
carried in local patrol cars.  In sum, the sheer number of potential violations 
makes it obvious that enterprising police officers can detect a possible 
traffic or equipment violation on virtually all motor vehicles. 
Officer 
Are there situations in which a court will conclude that an observed 
violation does not allow police to stop a motorist? 
Trainer 
Yes.  Although the North Dakota Supreme Court—like many others—
has generally been very accepting of stops of motor vehicles for virtually 
any violation, the court nonetheless held that “slight” in-lane weaving may 
not be sufficient to justify a stop.194  The North Dakota Supreme Court has, 
on other occasions, held that in-lane weaving may be sufficient to stop.195 
Officer 
Does it matter if the weaving causes the car to cross lane-marking 
lines? 
Trainer 
Yes.  For example, on numerous occasions, the North Dakota Supreme 
Court has held that crossing a fog line or center line is sufficient to justify a 





193. § 52-04-03-07. 
194. Salter v. N.D. Dep’t of Transp., 505 N.W.2d 111, 113 (N.D. 1993). 
195. Hanson v. Director, N.D. Dep’t of Transp., 2003 ND 175, ¶ 17, 671 N.W.2d 780, 784 
(holding that weaving, even without a traffic offense, justifies a seizure); State v. Dorendorf, 359 
N.W.2d 115, 116-17 (N.D. 1984) (concluding the officers had the requisite reasonable suspicion 
to stop after observing a vehicle weaving within its own lane of traffic). 
196. See, e.g., State v. Berger, 2001 ND 44, ¶ 2, 623 N.W.2d 25, 26; State v. Loh, 2000 ND 
188, ¶ 8, 618 N.W.2d 477, 479 (holding a stop valid when an officer observed slow speed, 
crossing the fog line twice, crossing the center line once, and in-lane weaving); State v. Burris, 
545 N.W.2d 192, 193 (N.D. 1996) (traveling less than the posted speed limit and crossing the fog 
line twice justified a stop); Johnson v. N.D. Dep’t of Transp., 530 N.W.2d 359, 360-61 (N.D. 
1995) (crossing the fog line and the center line justified a stop); Jorgenson v. N.D. Dep’t of 
Transp., 498 N.W.2d 167, 168 (N.D. 1993) (crossing the center and fog lines justified a stop). 
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“practicable” to maintain a single traffic lane.  The relevant statute says, 
“[a] vehicle must be driven as nearly as practicable entirely within a single 
lane and may not be moved from such lane until the driver has first ascer-
tained that such movement can be made with safety.”197  One would think 
that by using the term “practicable,” while providing authority to move out-
side a lane if it is done “with safety,” the legislature has attempted to pro-
vide some leeway for drivers.  The North Dakota Supreme Court, however, 
has rigidly upheld stops for minimal movement outside a travel lane.198 
Officer 
Do courts in other states allow some leeway for drivers? 
Trainer 
Yes.  Many other state courts—in states with statutory language 
identical to that of North Dakota—have held that stopping a motorist for 
weaving outside a travel lane is not constitutionally reasonable.199  Those 
courts have recognized that very minor traffic violations may not authorize 
police stops.200  Many of these courts have recognized that several innocent 
reasons may explain why a driver slightly moves outside a travel lane, such 
as wind, a brief distraction, a roadway obstruction, or the like.  In North 
 
197. N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-10-17(1) (2009). 
198. See State v. Wolfer, 2010 ND 63, ¶ 9, 780 N.W.2d 650 (declining to adopt the rationale 
of courts concluding that movement outside a travel lane, without more, is insufficient to warrant 
a seizure); see also supra note 163. 
199. See, e.g., State v. Ross, 149 P.3d 876, 880 (Kan. Ct. App. 2007).  Analyzing a statute 
identical to North Dakota Century Code section 39-10-17(1), the court stated driving within a 
single lane: 
“[a]s nearly as practicable” connotes something less than the absolute.  Automobiles 
are not railway locomotives.  They do not run on fixed rails.  [The statute] does not 
prohibit a vehicle from changing lanes.  A driver is permitted to exercise, rather is 
required to exercise, discretion in deciding when and where to change lanes.  We need 
not drive through a pothole in the road and damage our vehicle in the process when we 
may safely avoid it by changing lanes or moving partially onto the shoulder of the 
roadway. 
Id. at 879. 
200. See State v. Curtis, 29 S.W.3d 688, 695 (Tex. App. 2006) (swerving from lane to lane 
and crossing the fog line did not justify a seizure), overruled by State v. Curtis, 238 S.W.3d 376 
(Tex. Crim. App. 2007); State v. Phillips, No. 8-04-25, 2006 WL 3477003, at *3 (Ohio App. 3d 
Dec. 4, 2006) (crossing the fog line did not provide reasonable suspicion or probable cause to 
seize a vehicle), abrogated by State v. Mays, 894 N.E.2d 1204, 1206, 1210 (Ohio 2008) (holding 
police have reasonable suspicion to stop a motorist who twice crosses a right white edge line); 
Commonwealth v. Turney, 76 Pa. D. & C.4th 211, 212, 217 (2005) (police did not have sufficient 
basis to seize a driver who crossed the fog line two times and traveled on the berm one time); 
State v. Huddleston, 164 S.W.3d 711, 716 (Tex. App. 2005) (crossing the fog line on five 
occasions over five to six miles does not justify a seizure); State v. Allain, 688 N.W.2d 783 
(Table), No. 03-3272-CR, 2004 WL 2110402, at *2, *5 (Wis. Ct. App. Sept. 24, 2004) (crossing 
the fog line on a curved road does not justify a seizure); State v. Smith, 21 S.W.3d 251, 252, 258 
(Tenn. Crim. App. 1999) (driving on the fog line did not justify a seizure); see also Wolfer, 2010 
ND 63, ¶ 9, 780 N.W.2d 650 (compiling cases in which courts have held crossing a lane marker is 
insufficient to justify a seizure). 
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Dakota, however, innocent or explainable reasons for unusual driving con-
duct have been rejected by the court.201  Our state supreme court has repeat-
edly said, “It is well settled, traffic violations, even if considered common 
or minor, constitute prohibited conduct which provide officers with requi-
site suspicion for conducting investigatory stops.”202  So, while many courts 
may conclude stopping too long at a stop sign and in-lane weaving of a 
motorcycle does not authorize a stop, our court has held otherwise.203 
Officer 
Am I permitted to stop or contact citizens even if there is no violation? 
Trainer 
In North Dakota, the answer is likely yes, but it depends upon the 
circumstances.  These could be classified as “suspicionless stops,” or stops 
resulting from no particularized, articulable, or identifiable suspicion.  The 
most recognized example of suspicionless stops are sobriety checkpoints.204  
In suspicionless stops, the officer has stopped, or in some way interfered 
with, a person’s freedom of movement, even though the officer has no 
articulable suspicion to justify the interference. 
Officer 
Because officers need some level of proof to seize or stop people, do I 
need probable cause or reasonable suspicion to approach a parked car? 
Trainer 
In North Dakota, you likely need neither.  Courts have generally up-
held police-citizen encounters based upon unfettered discretion of an officer 
to approach an already stopped motorist.205  The North Dakota Supreme 
 
201. See Kappel v. Director, N.D. Dep’t of Transp., 1999 ND 213, ¶ 19, 602 N.W.2d 718, 
722.  In Kappel, the court held a police officer had reasonable suspicion to make an investigative 
stop after observing a motorcycle pause longer than normal at a stop sign and then watching it 
weave within its own lane. Id. ¶¶ 5, 19, 602 N.W.2d at 720, 722.  In reaching its conclusion, the 
court said “the reasonable suspicion standard does not require an officer to see a motorist violating 
a traffic law or to rule out every potential innocent excuse for the behavior in question before 
stopping a vehicle for investigation.” Id. ¶ 10, 602 N.W.2d at 721. 
202. State v. Westmiller, 2007 ND 52, ¶ 9, 730 N.W.2d 134, 138; In re K.H., 2006 ND 156, 
¶ 8, 718 N.W.2d 575, 578; State v. Haibeck, 2004 ND 163, ¶ 13, 685 N.W.2d 517, 517; Hanson v. 
N.D. Dep’t of Transp., 2003 ND 175, ¶ 15, 671 N.W.2d 780, 784; State v. Fields, 2003 ND 81, ¶ 
7, 662 N.W.2d 242, 245; State v. Leher, 2002 ND 71, ¶ 12, 653 N.W.2d 56, 61; In re T.J.K., 1999 
ND 152, ¶ 9, 598 N.W.2d 781, 784; Kahl v. Director, N.D. Dep’t of Transp., 1997 ND 147, ¶ 12, 
567 N.W.2d 197, 200; State v. Storbakken, 552 N.W.2d 78, 80 (N.D. 1996); Zimmerman v. N.D. 
Dep’t of Transp., 543 N.W.2d 479, 482 (N.D. 1996); State v. Hawley, 540 N.W.2d 390, 393 (N.D. 
1995); City of Wahpeton v. Roles, 524 N.W.2d 598, 600-01 (N.D. 1994); State v. Stadsvold, 456 
N.W.2d 295, 296 (N.D. 1990). 
203. See supra note 201. 
204. See, e.g., Michigan Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990); City of 
Bismarck v. Uhden, 513 N.W.2d 373, 377 (N.D. 1994). 
205. In City of Fargo v. Sivertson, the North Dakota Supreme Court stated, “Ordinarily, an 
officer must have an articulable and reasonable suspicion that a law has been or is being violated 
to stop a moving vehicle for an investigation.” 1997 ND 204, ¶ 9, 571 N.W.2d 137, 140.  But, 
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Court has quickly, readily, and consistently applied this theory.206  The 
court reasons that encounters between parked motorists and police are 
“consensual encounters,” not seizures. 
Officer 
What about driving under the influence or drug interdiction check-
points?  These encounters obviously are not based upon reasonable suspi-
cion or probable cause. 
Trainer 
Indeed, these are suspicionless seizures. Although the United States 
Supreme Court has found suspicionless stops of vehicles reasonable for 
purposes of detecting and apprehending drunk drivers,207 suspicionless 
stops to detect and apprehend drug couriers are not reasonable.208  In deter-
mining whether the actions of police are reasonable, the courts will balance 
the governmental interests with the interests of individuals who are sub-
jected to the governmental action.  Although one could reasonably argue 
the governmental interest in deterring the introduction of drugs into society 
is as dangerous as deterring a drinking driver, the United States Supreme 
Court has held a “checkpoint program whose primary purpose was to detect 
evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing,” like drug possession, is not 
constitutional.209 Importantly, sobriety checkpoints must be operated within 
guidelines that limit discretion left to the patrol officer. 
Officer 
What about circumstances where an officer stops a car because it 
appears the driver or occupants might be sick? 
Trainer 
The “community caretaking encounter” is another suspicionless 
seizure.210  This suspicionless stop is justified on the notion that the 
 
according to the court, “the law distinguishes between approaching an already stopped vehicle and 
stopping a moving one.” Id. (citing State v. Neis, 469 N.W.2d 568, 569 (N.D.1991)); see also 
State v. Gahner, 554 N.W.2d 818, 820 (N.D.1996). 
206. Sivertson, ¶ 9, 571 N.W.2d at 140; see also City of Grand Forks v. Zejdlik, 551 N.W.2d 
772, 774 (N.D. 1996); Borowicz v. N.D. Dep’t of Transp., 529 N.W.2d 186, 188 (N.D. 1995); 
State v. Halfmann, 518 N.W.2d 729, 731 (N.D. 1994); State v. Franklin, 524 N.W.2d 603, 605 
(N.D. 1994); State v. Langseth, 492 N.W.2d 298, 300 (N.D. 1992); Wibben v. N.D. State 
Highway Comm’r, 413 N.W.2d 329, 334-35 (N.D. 1987) (Vande Walle, J., concurring). 
207. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 455. 
208. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 48 (2001).  After Edmond, the United 
States Supreme Court allowed brief suspicionsless stops to find witnesses to a crime.  Illinois v. 
Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 428 (2004). 
209. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 37-38; but see State v. Everson, 474 N.W.2d 695, 701 (N.D. 1991) 
(holding a narcotics checkpoint did not violate the Fourth Amendment). 
210. See, e.g., Lapp v. N.D. Dep’t of Transp., 2001 ND 140, ¶ 17, 632 N.W.2d 419, 424; 
Sivertson, ¶ 16, 571 N.W.2d at 141; Zejdlik, 551 N.W.2d at 773-75; Franklin, 524 N.W.2d at 605; 
Halfmann, 518 N.W.2d at 730-31. 
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encounter is not a seizure because the officer is not investigating a viola-
tion.  The community caretaking encounter is recognized in a number of 
states,211 and generally requires the officer to act “in a capacity totally 
divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence 
relating to the violation of a criminal statute.”212  The theory is that police 
function not only to investigate crime, but also to assist the public, so when 
police approach a parked car to make sure “everything is okay,” a seizure 
does not result.213  This doctrine recognizes and enforces the concept that 
police have virtually unfettered discretion to approach a stopped car.  
Courts almost always uphold this type of activity as a “consensual 
encounter” as long as the officer initiates contact without a show of 
authority like the use of emergency lights.214 
Officer 
Are there circumstances where police may be able to stop a motorist 
even though there is no suspicion or caretaking role? 
Trainer 
Sure.  Although these contacts could arguably be called “community 
caretaking,” it is probably more appropriate to refer to these contacts as 
“unclassifiable encounters.”  For example, as public servants, police often 
believe they have a duty to assist citizens, regardless of the minimal nature 
of the citizen’s peril.  Officers have been known to stop motorists for: open 
doors; coats caught in a car door; keys, purses, or luggage atop a car; or 
various other reasons.215  An unusual, but not atypical, example is the stop 
of a motorist driving with a flat tire.  As you may have already concluded, 
this conduct is arguably a violation of the traffic code.216 
 
211. State v. Nemeth, 23 P.3d 936, 944-45 (N.M. 2001); State v. Goetaski, 507 A.2d 751, 
753 (N.J. 1986); State v. Parker, 503 A.2d 809, 813 (N.H. 1985); State v. Harrison, 533 P.2d 
1143, 1145 (Ariz. 1975). 
212. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973). 
213. See cases cited supra note 206. 
214. See State v. Langseth, 492 N.W.2d 298, 300 (N.D. 1992) (noting a show of authority, 
including emergency lights, constitutes a seizure). 
215. These cases don’t make the reporters—perhaps as a matter of prosecutorial discretion, 
perhaps as a matter of plea bargaining, or perhaps because the officer knows a resulting arrest 
would not withstand scrutiny regarding the validity of the stop.  In any event, these stops do take 
place—and citizens truly do expect an officer to stop them to make them aware their purse is loose 
atop the car.  It is, by the way, the taxpayer’s money that bought all the fancy equipment that can 
be used to get the absent-minded driver’s attention before the purse hits the road. 
216. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-21-40(2) (2009) (prohibiting “metal tires” from making 
contact with the roadway). 
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Officer 
As a police officer, it seems that expansive authority to stop motorists 
is a good thing.  More stops result in more arrests.  As long as we follow the 
guidance provided by the courts, why would people be concerned? 
Trainer 
For the most part, citizens will respect you for following the law and 
doing your best to do your job—which includes detecting and apprehending 
criminals.  The concern, however, is that many citizens with whom you 
have contact are not criminals; instead, they have simply violated a traffic 
law or ordinance.  Some limitations may be appropriate. 
IV. PROPOSED LEGISLATION TO PROTECT THE PRIVACY OF 
PERSONS STOPPED FOR NONCRIMINALTRAFFIC OFFENSES 
Currently, North Dakota Century Code section 39-07-07, entitled 
“Halting person for violating traffic regulations - Duty of officer halting,” 
provides: 
Whenever any person is halted for the violation of any of the 
provisions of chapters 39-01 through 39-13, 39-18, 39-21, and 39-
24, or of equivalent city ordinances, the officer halting that person, 
except as otherwise provided in section 39-07-09 and section 39-
20-03.1 or 39-20-03.2, may: 
1. Take the name and address of the person; 
2. Take the license number of the person’s motor vehicle; and 
3. If a city ordinance or state criminal traffic violation, issue a 
summons or otherwise notify that person in writing to appear 
at a time and place to be specified in the summons or notice 
or, if a state noncriminal traffic violation, notify the person of 
the right to request a hearing when posting bond by mail. 
A halting officer employed by any political subdivision of the state 
may not take a person into custody or require that person to 
proceed with the officer to any other location for the purpose of 
posting bond, where the traffic violation was a noncriminal offense 
under section 39-06.1-02. The officer shall provide the person with 
an envelope for use in mailing the bond.217 
We propose adding the following: 
An officer halting a vehicle for a noncriminal offense under sec-
tion 39-06.1-02 must possess at least probable cause to believe the 
 
217. § 39-07-07. 
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offense was committed.  After a vehicle is halted for a noncriminal 
offense: 
1. The halting officer must diligently and expeditiously 
complete the citation process, which may last not longer than 
necessary.  Any questions or activities during that process 
must be limited to those related to the traffic offense serving 
as the basis for the stop. 
2. The halting officer may require production of and inspect 
the driver’s license, documentation regarding the vehicle’s 
ownership, and proof of insurance.  In addition, the officer 
may obtain computer verification of the driver’s license and 
vehicle registration and check for warrants outstanding on the 
driver, provided the warrant check does not unreasonably 
extend the duration of the stop.  Criminal records searches 
may be done only where the officer has reasonable suspicion 
to believe the driver is engaged in criminal conduct.  No 
demand for identification shall be made of any passenger, and 
no other checks (e.g., warrants and criminal history) of pas-
sengers may be conducted unless there is reasonable suspicion 
to believe the passenger is engaged in criminal activity.  If the 
driver is incapable of continued driving, and if the vehicle is 
relinquished to a passenger, the halting officer may require the 
passenger to produce a valid driver’s license before being 
allowed to drive the halted vehicle. 
3. The halting officer may question the driver about the 
traffic offense for which the stop was made, but, unless the 
officer has reasonable suspicion to believe the driver or a 
passenger possesses drugs, a weapon, or contraband, no ques-
tions may be asked about drugs, weapons, or other subjects 
unrelated to the traffic offense for which the stop was made, 
such as questions regarding travel plans (e.g., destination and 
purpose). 
4. The halting officer may not seek consent to search the 
stopped vehicle, the driver, or the passengers, during the stop 
or after the citation is issued, unless there is reasonable suspi-
cion to believe contraband or evidence of a crime is concealed 
in the vehicle or on the person of a vehicle occupant.  Before 
seeking consent, an officer must clearly end the traffic stop by 
explaining that the motorist is free to leave and need not 
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consent and by returning any occupants’ documents before or 
while so explaining. 
5. The vehicle stopped and its occupants may not be sub-
jected to the inspection of a drug detection dog unless there is 
reasonable suspicion to believe there are drugs in the vehicle 
or conveyed by the occupants. 
Evidence found as a result of a violation of this section by a law 
enforcement officer is not admissible in a criminal case against 
any occupant of the car at the time of the stop. 
A. PROBABLE CAUSE REQUIRED FOR NONCRIMINAL TRAFFIC STOPS 
We propose the legislature require probable cause as the required 
minimum basis for a noncriminal traffic offense stop in North Dakota.  This 
would be a minimal change from the status quo.  Professor LaFave has long 
argued that serious criminal offenses should be suspected as the required 
basis for an investigative stop based on reasonable suspicion.218  The range 
of historical and proposed bases for vehicle stops is roughly as follows, 
from the least restrictive to the most restrictive: (1) reasonable suspicion 
sufficient for any stop, even for noncriminal offenses; (2) probable cause 
required for noncriminal stops; (3) probable cause required for all stops 
except reasonable suspicion sufficient for stops to investigate serious crime; 
and (4) probable cause required for all vehicle stops.  The first basis listed is 
the current legal status quo, described at length above.  The second basis 
listed is our proposed legislative modification.  The third basis listed is 
Professor LaFave’s longstanding suggestion for appropriate Fourth Amend-
ment law, which has been ignored by many courts, especially those of 
North Dakota.  It was apparently adopted by the North Dakota Legislature 
in 1969 with section 29-29-21’s limits on such stops, but subsequently was 
rejected by the North Dakota Supreme Court in Uhden.219  The final basis 
was proposed in 1992’s initiated measure (Proposition 6).  It would have 
gone further and required probable cause for all car stops.220  Law enforce-
ment came out strongly against Proposition 6 as too severe an impediment 
 
218. LAFAVE, supra note 18, § 9.3(a), at 366. 
219. 513 N.W.2d 373 (N.D. 1994).  See supra notes 63-67 (abrogating statutory limitations 
on police authority to seize). 
220. Memorandum prepared by the North Dakota Legislative Council Staff, Information on 
the 1992 Primary and General Election Ballot Measures (Sept. 1992) (on file with authors). 
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to their efforts to catch criminals, and the proposition was rejected by the 
voters.221 
The proposal to limit investigative stops to serious offenses is com-
mendable.  Drawing lines between serious and minor crimes, however, 
might be impractical today given the long disregard for, and subsequent 
gutting of, section 29-29-21’s limits on such stops.222  Thus, we propose the 
more modest step of requiring probable cause only for noncriminal offense 
stops.  The United States Supreme Court’s misgivings in Atwater about 
drawing lines between serious and minor crimes223 are irrelevant to North 
Dakota and noncriminal traffic cases.  Since 1973, the state legislature has 
mandated different procedures for criminal and noncriminal offenses.  
Everyone knows the maxim “ignorance of the law is no excuse,” and it 
would be unseemly for North Dakota police to claim ignorance or the 
courts to cut the police slack for not knowing whether they are stopping for 
a criminal or noncriminal offense. 
Our proposal gains legislative palatability, however, at the possible 
expense of broader enhancement of Fourth Amendment rights urged by 
LaFave.224  But the modest step we propose might limit the use of minor 
traffic offenses as pretexts for drug investigations.  Stops are now permitted 
on reasonable suspicion for “extremely minor and technical violations.”225  
We have shown that even in North Dakota, “very few drivers can traverse 
any appreciable distance without violating some traffic regulation.  This 
means that virtually anyone (even a Supreme Court Justice) may readily be 
stopped, which suggests a need for some additional limitation upon the 
authority to stop that might help prevent pretextual or arbitrary seizures.”226  
 
221. INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM INSTITUTE, NORTH DAKOTA INITIATIVE HISTORICAL 
LISTING 7, http://www.iandrinstitute.org/New%20IRI%20Website%20Info/I&R%20Research% 
20and%20History/I&R%20at%20the%20Statewide%20Level/Usage%20history/North%20Dakot
a.pdf. 
222. See supra notes 63-67, 219 and accompanying text. 
223. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 347-51 (2001). 
224. LAFAVE, supra note 18, § 9.3(a), at 366.  LaFave argues: 
[a]n express limitation upon Terry stops on reasonable suspicion to those instances in 
which the suspected offense is one “involving danger of forcible injury to persons or 
of appropriation of or damage to property” so that probable cause would be required 
for most traffic stops (except, e.g., driving under the influence), would be one 
significant step toward enhancing the Fourth Amendment rights of suspected traffic 
violators, especially in light of the now well-established police practice of using traffic 
stops to seek out drugs.  The point is simply this: any extraordinary grant of police 
authority out to be circumscribed in such a way so that meaningful review is possible, 
so that the public is not apprehensive about police excess, and so as to “remove the 
temptation for the police to go on fishing expeditions for contraband.” 
Id. at 366 (footnotes omitted). 
225. Id. 
226. Id. 
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This is especially important because the United States Supreme Court 
“slammed the door” on preventing pretextual stops in Whren v. United 
States.227  Whren’s rejection of a pretext doctrine calls for both a probable 
cause requirement for at least noncriminal stops and further limits on the 
dimensions of such stops, which we discuss below. 
Current North Dakota case law, after Uhden, permits reasonable 
suspicion stops for the most trivial of offenses.  We hope that legislators 
will identify with the average driver that is not guilty of any criminal viola-
tion, more than our state supreme court justices who seldom meet a traffic 
stop they feel is unwarranted.  Justices see only that the motorist—first the 
defendant, and now the appellant—is a guilty criminal.  What of the 
average stop?  Although statistics are not readily available, legislators 
should realize that most North Dakota drivers and their passengers are not 
criminals.  The lower the required basis for a stop, the more innocent 
drivers and passengers will be stopped.  How many is too many?  We know 
the answer of the North Dakota Supreme Court—essentially, “you, the 
police, may stop anybody you even reasonably suspect of a minor, noncrim-
inal, traffic offense.  You do not need the higher certainty of probable 
cause—anything more than a mere hunch will do.” 
Assume, as discussed earlier,228 that probable cause requires at least a 
forty percent likelihood the offense is taking place.229  Reasonable suspicion 
is less than probable cause, so, again, assume it requires only a thirty per-
cent likelihood.  If the police actually understand the difference, a doubtful 
proposition,230 it would mean that out of every 100 stops in North Dakota, 
60% could be innocent of the violation for which stopped if probable cause 
is required; if only reasonable suspicion is required, 70% could be innocent.  
The stops would still be justified because both standards permit errors. 
Of course, a ten percent decrease in invasions of privacy rights might 
seem insignificant to some—unless they are one of the stopped innocents.  
Because courts, including both the United States Supreme Court and our 
own state courts, refuse to name the statistical level of certainty identified 
with either probable cause or reasonable suspicion, the reality is that 
 
227. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996); see also, Wayne R. LaFave, The 
“Routine Traffic Stop” from Start to Finish:  Too Much “Routine” and Not Enough Fourth 
Amendment, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1843, 1853 (2004) (stating the Supreme Court “slammed the 
door” on effective reform to prevent pretext stops in Whren). 
228. See supra notes 89-93. 
229. See supra note 90. 
230. This is not meant as disrespect for the police.  Rather, it reflects the authors’ own 
difficulty in understanding the difference between the two standards.  See supra note 93 
(acknowledging the complexity of quantifying the distinctions between reasonable suspicion and 
probable cause). 
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reducing the level required from probable cause to reasonable suspicion is 
largely a rhetorical move.  What we are proposing is simply to curtail such 
widespread encouragement for police to stop motorists not reasonably 
suspected of any crime by limiting the police to instances where they have 
probable cause, as is often the case.231  The remainder of the proposed 
statute deals with limits on what the police may do, in their zeal to catch 
criminals, once they stop someone for a noncriminal offense. 
B. LIMITS ON POLICE ACTIVITY AFTER STOPPING 
1. Length of Stop and General Limit on Questioning and Other 
Police Post-Stop Activity 
Courts have not generally applied the temporal and scope limits of 
Terry stops to traffic stops.232  Contrary to Illinois v. Caballes,233 our 
proposed legislation is intended to make clear that the stopping officer’s 
actions must be “reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which 
justified the interference in the first place.”234  In State v. Fields, the North 
Dakota Supreme Court applied Terry analysis and specifically reminded it 
had previously “explained that for traffic stops, ‘[a] reasonable period of 
detention includes the amount of time necessary for the officer to complete 
his duties resulting from the traffic stop.’”235  “Once the purposes of the 
initial traffic stop are completed, a continued detention of a traffic violator 
violates the Fourth Amendment unless the officer has a reasonable suspi-
cion for believing that criminal activity is afoot.”236  An individual reading 
that strong statement might wonder whether our proposed legislation is in-
deed necessary.  Our answer is that for persons not suspected of a criminal 
offense—the average speeder, for example—the scope of the halting 
officer’s duties as explained in Fields is too expansive.  Fields quotes the 
Eighth Circuit’s list of duties: 
[R]equest[ing] the driver’s license and registration, request[ing] 
that the driver step out of the vehicle, request[ing] that the driver 
wait in the patrol car, conduct[ing] computer inquiries to deter-
mine the validity of the license and registration, conduct[ing] 
 
231. See supra note 121 (noting most observed traffic violations establish probable cause of 
a traffic violation). 
232. See LAFAVE, supra note 18, § 9.3(a), at 367. 
233. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005). 
234. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968). 
235. State v. Fields, 2003 ND 81, ¶ 8, 662 N.W.2d 242, 245 (quoting State v. Mertz, 362 
N.W.2d 410, 412 (N.D. 1985)). 
236. Fields, ¶ 10, 662 N.W.2d at 246. 
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computer searches to investigate the driver’s criminal history and 
to determine if the driver has outstanding warrants, and mak[ing] 
inquiries as to the motorist’s destination and purpose.237 
Our proposed statute would not permit such a wide range of duties for 
noncriminal stops.  It would also limit police manipulation of traffic stop 
duties, which would in turn limit unfounded criminal investigation. 
Limitations are appropriate, even with a probable cause requirement.  
Although the United States Supreme Court said in Berkemer v. McCarty238 
that a traffic stop is “more analogous to a so-called ‘Terry stop’ than to a 
formal arrest,” analogous does not mean identical.239  We propose addi-
tional limitations because the subjects of the covered stops are not criminal 
suspects.  Some may object that the police and prosecution should not be 
hampered by a higher requirement (probable cause) than for a Terry investi-
gative stop (reasonable suspicion), while still held to the Terry scope limits.  
The simple answer to that objection is that the basis for the stop is based 
upon a belief only that a very minor, indeed noncriminal, offense has been 
committed.  Motorists not suspected of any crime should get the benefit of 
both temporal and scope limits and the higher quantum of evidence (prob-
able cause rather than reasonable suspicion) precisely because there is no 
basis to believe criminal activity is involved.  The criminal activity uncov-
ered in typical cases is a result of long and intrusive stops, not a rationale 
for them.  Given the large number of traffic offenders subjected to longer 
and more intrusive procedures, the benefit of uncovering the criminals 
among them is insufficient justification for the protracted detentions.  
Specific limitations are described below. 
2. Specific Limits on Post-Stop Questions and Investigation 
Our suggestions basically parallel Professor LaFave’s for courts 
interpreting the Fourth Amendment.240  LaFave points out that the “bare 
essentials of a routine traffic stop consist of causing the vehicle to stop, 
explaining to the driver the reason for the stop, verifying the credentials of 
the driver and the vehicle, and then issuing a citation or a warning.”241  
Additional activities beyond the “bare essentials” violate close application 
 
237. United States v. Jones, 269 F.3d 919, 924 (8th Cir. 2001). 
238. 468 U.S. 420 (1984). 
239. Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 439. 
240. See LAFAVE, supra note 18, § 9.3(c)-(d), at 379-94. 
241. Id. at 377. 
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of the Terry doctrine.242  Nonetheless, verification of a driver’s license and 
vehicle registration is consistent with the basis for the stop.243 
a. Warrant and Criminal History Checks 
Warrant checks, at least if not overly time-consuming, are grudgingly 
permitted by LaFave’s vision of the Fourth Amendment.244  But we incor-
porate LaFave’s argument for: 
[A] total prohibition (without regard to whether the check in-
creases the time of detention significantly or at all) on the use of 
criminal history checks incident to traffic stops except when there 
also exists a reasonable suspicion of more serious criminal 
conduct.  Because in this “war on drugs” via traffic stops the 
criminal history check serves to identify drivers who deserve (at 
least in the officer’s mind) more intense scrutiny, a prohibition on 
such checks could contribute in a meaningful way to reducing the 
number of pretext stops as well as the number of stops in which 
the motorist is subjected to excessive scrutiny and detention.245 
LaFave rejects the justification of criminal history checks based on the 
rubric of officer safety.  He concludes that other permitted procedures, such 
as frisks and searches of a vehicle based on reasonable suspicion and even 
removal of the driver and passengers without any reasonable suspicion, are 
sufficient to assure officer safety.246 
The proposed legislation prohibits record checks of passengers, absent 
reasonable suspicion of crime.  Any argument in favor of routine, suspi-
cionless checks of passengers would presumably apply to citizens 
generally.  Imagine you are at the public library paying a fine for an over-
due book.  While waiting for the librarian to check your lending record, a 
 
242. Id. at 377-94. 
243. Id. at 378-80. 
244. Id. at 380-84.  LaFave, while noting that warrant checks have become routine, also 
notes good reasons for prohibiting them when not related to any specific suspicion related to the 
traffic offense upon which the stop is based.  Nonetheless, LaFave states: 
While there is much to these arguments, I would not press as hard for a change in the 
warrant check practice as I would as to other procedures I recommend later herein 
should be prohibited.  This is because there are at least some rational arguments that 
can be made for retaining the warrant check routine as to a person who apparently has 
committed a traffic offense. 
Id. (emphasis added).  The “rational arguments” LaFave offers are to check for prior traffic 
offenses, which he analogizes to the license and registration check, and to make the scope of 
inquiries for traffic violations parallel with non-traffic Terry stops, where warrant checks are 
permitted for offenses not related to the reason for the stop. Id. at 383-84. 
245. Id. at 385-86. 
246. Id. 
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government computer is checked to see if you have any outstanding war-
rants or criminal history.  Such checks would be analogous to “routinely” 
doing the same for drivers, minus, of course, the intimidation factor of a 
police officer’s authority—a uniform, badge, gun, and police power. 
Now, imagine you are merely accompanying a friend stopping at the 
library to pay a fine.  Assume the librarian asks your name and perhaps for 
your library card to justify your presence in the library, then runs a warrant 
and criminal history check on you while your friend waits to complete the 
fine payment procedure.  Such invasiveness would be intolerable, but is 
practically indistinguishable from routine record checks of passengers 
riding with noncriminal traffic offenders. 
b. Prohibition of Questioning About Drugs, Weapons, 
and Other Subjects Unrelated to a Traffic Offense, 
Absent Reasonable Suspicion 
LaFave criticizes numerous court decisions that have allowed ques-
tioning unrelated to the traffic stop, but was instead designed to uncover the 
possession of drugs or weapons.  Regarding court decisions claiming this 
type of questioning promotes the public interest in fighting illegal drugs, he 
bluntly states: 
These positions are dead wrong!  They are totally at odds with the 
Terry line of Supreme Court decisions on the limits applicable to 
temporary detentions, and amount to nothing more than an 
encouragement to police to undertake pretextual traffic stops so 
that they may engage in interrogation about drugs in a custodial 
setting (albeit not custodial enough to bring even the protections of 
Miranda into play).  The correct rule is that followed by some 
other courts: that in strict accordance with Terry and its progeny, 
questioning during a traffic stop must be limited to the purpose of 
the traffic stop and thus may not be extended to the subject of 
drugs.247 
 
LaFave’s position requires him to criticize “the Supreme Court’s no-
search-ergo-no-scope-violation oversimplification in Illinois v. 
Caballes.”248  Because Caballes led to Muehler v. Mena, where the court 
held that a “detainee could be questioned on any subject so long as the 
seizure was not lengthened as a consequence,” courts have understandably 
 
247. Id. at 391. 
248. Id. (discussing Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005)). 
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relied on Muehler in taking that same approach with respect to traffic 
stops.249 
LaFave recognizes that questioning about weapons is a close call, but 
he ultimately rejects the idea that such questions should be permitted under 
a theory that officer and bystander safety is a more compelling interest than 
uncovering criminality.  He rejects that theory because there are many other 
means available for ensuring officer safety, including requiring the traffic 
violator to exit his vehicle and remain outside during the entire period of the 
detention.250 
c. Reasonable Suspicion and Warning Required for 
Request for Consent to Search 
Seeking consent to search has become routine for officers making 
minor traffic stops.251 
These requests result in affirmative responses in the overwhelming 
majority of cases; guilty or innocent, “most motorists stopped and 
asked by police for consent to search their vehicles will expressly 
give permission to search their vehicles,” resulting in “thousands 
upon thousands of motor vehicle searches of innocent travelers 
each year.”252 
As with the police techniques discussed earlier, when the resulting 
search turns up drugs, courts generally approve of the request for consent, 
finding the consent to be voluntary.253  The exceptions involve cases where 
the consent is requested and obtained after the traffic stop had or should 
have been completed.254  Professor LaFave again criticizes the courts for 
their excessive deference to what has become routine police practice: 
Here again, the failure of most courts, when dealing with traffic 
stop consent searches, to adhere to the Terry limits on what con-
stitutes a reasonably temporary detention has produced very 
distressful results.  Consent searches are no longer an occasional 
event by which a crime suspect may “advise the police of his or 
her wishes and for the police to act in reliance on that under-
standing,” but are now a wholesale activity accompanying a great 
 
249. LAFAVE, supra note 18, § 9.3(d), at 391. 
250. Id. § 9.3(b), at 239. 
251. Id. § 9.3(e), at 395. 
252. Id. (quoting Robert H. Whorf, Consent Searches Following Routine Traffic Stops—The 
Troubled Jurisprudence of a Doomed Drug Interdiction Technique, 28 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1, 2 
(2001)). 
253. LAFAVE, supra note 18, § 9.3(e), at 396. 
254. Id. 
       
54 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 86:1 
many traffic stops, submitted to by most drivers, guilty or inno-
cent, and resulting in continued interruption of their travels for a 
substantial period of time while they wait by the roadside as their 
vehicles are ransacked, a process which beyond question “is highly 
invasive of the dignitary interest of individuals.”   Certainly the 
best way to deal with this problem is as in State v. Fort, involving 
a traffic stop for speeding and a cracked windshield; the court 
quite correctly held that the officer’s “consent inquiry . . . went 
beyond the scope of the traffic stop and was unsupported by any 
reasonable articulable suspicion,” meaning the evidence obtained 
via the consent must be suppressed, without regard to whether the 
inquiry and subsequent search “may also have extended the 
duration of the traffic stop.”  Regrettably, here again the Supreme 
Court’s ill-considered decision in Illinois v. Caballes appears to 
point in the opposite direction.255 
Our proposed legislation sides with Professor LaFave and the 
Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in Fort256 by limiting the intrusive-
ness of the noncriminal traffic stop through a requirement of reasonable 
suspicion as a condition to requesting consent.257 
The language “during the stop or after the citation is issued”258 is 
prompted by the tendency of some courts to allow officers to ask for con-
sent to search after completion of the traffic stop on the bogus theory that 
the “stop” has magically transformed into a “consensual encounter.”259  
Granted, the United States Supreme Court held, in Ohio v. Robinette,260 that 
no police warnings are required to obtain consent.  But that does not belie 
the fact that courts have unrealistically determined that the initial stop is 
terminated because the driver at this point feels free to leave.  As LaFave 
convincingly argues: 
It is . . . nonsensical for courts to continue their embrace of the . . . 
position that a reasonable motorist, having been seized, would 
conclude he was free to leave (even though not told so) in the face 
of ongoing police interrogation.  As police materials for public 
consumption and for use in driver’s education training specifically 
 
255. LAFAVE, supra note 18, § 9.3(e), at 396 (footnotes omitted). 
256. State v. Fort, 660 N.W.2d 415 (Minn. 2003). 
257. LAFAVE, supra note 18, § 9.3(e), at 397. 
258. See discussion supra Part IV (proposing an addition to section 39-07-07 of the North 
Dakota Century Code). 
259. LAFAVE, supra note 18, § 9.3(g), at 402-06. 
260. 519 U.S. 33 (1996). 
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indicate, a motorist subjected to a traffic stop is not free to leave 
until expressly told so by the officer.261 
The warning requirement we propose is consistent with the Ohio 
Supreme Court’s remedy, rejected by the United States Supreme Court,262 
and also adds “a requirement that police return a motorist’s driving docu-
ments before or simultaneous with the statement ‘you are free to go.’”263 
d. Reasonable Suspicion Requirement for Use of 
Drug Sniffing Dog 
Although some courts have found dog drug-detection sniffing to be 
objectionable when done after the traffic detention was completed, in most 
cases, it can be completed during or quickly after the traffic stop itself.  
LaFave describes the courts’ willingness to employ a “fudge factor” on the 
temporal limits to a traffic stop: 
Here as well, it may be concluded that the appellate courts have, 
for the most part, missed the mark completely on the matter of 
drug dog sniffing in connection with traffic stops.  There should be 
no need for the complex and often nearly impossible task of calcu-
lating just when the time should be deemed to have expired in the 
case of a particular traffic stop and, often, the equally bedeviling 
task of heading down the slippery slop [sic] to determine just how 
much extra time after the proper ending of the traffic stop should 
be excused on some de mimimus theory.  Rather, the central point 
is that use of a drug sniffing dog has absolutely nothing to do with 
the traffic infraction which served as the sole justification in the 
first place, and for that reason alone should not be permitted at all.  
Allowing the dogs to be used serves only as a positive encourage-
ment for police to engage in pretext and subterfuge, hardly a 
defensible move given the common knowledge that traffic law 
enforcement has been diverted from its justified objectives to serve 
as a means for seeking out drugs.  Allowing use of the drug dogs 
at all in conjunction with traffic stops can only encourage the 
making of stops for insignificant and technical violations on the 
basis of unarticulated suspicions and mere hunches or, at worst, on 
totally arbitrary and discriminatory bases.  Moreover, allowing use 
 
261. LAFAVE, supra note 18, § 9.3(g), at 402. 
262. State v. Robinette, 653 N.E.2d 695, 698 (Ohio 1995), rev’d, 519 U.S. 33 (1969). 
263. Robert H. Whorf, “Coercive Ambiguity” in the Routine Traffic Stop Turned Consent 
Search, 30 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 379, 410 (1997); United States v. Soto, 988 F.2d 1548, 1557 
(10th Cir. 1993). 
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of the dogs at all intrudes into the process another decision, 
whether to summon a drug dog, which the cases indicate requires 
neither reasonable suspicion nor, for that matter, any justification 
whatsoever, but which the practice indicates is also likely to be 
made on an arbitrary basis.264 
Professor LaFave’s critique of the status quo is compelling.  He 
incredulously notes the courts have held the dog sniff itself is not a Fourth 
Amendment search.265  But that legal determination is incongruent because 
dog sniffs “taint the stop purportedly made only for a traffic violation 
because they have absolutely no relationship to traffic law enforcement.”266  
He convincingly points out the defects in the United States Supreme 
Court’s Caballes267 decision and underscores our repeated main point:  
maintaining the status quo created by courts, including the United States 
Supreme Court, ignores the rights of innocent motorists, for whom the use 
of drug dogs “produces many unpleasant and adverse consequences.”268 
LaFave’s list of five aspects of how the use of drug dogs is unpleasant 
and adverse is compelling.269  We ask readers—and legislators and judges 
—to imagine they are stopped for a minor offense, as in our introductory 
story where a judge, on her way to work, is stopped for obstructed vision 
from a parking permit hanging from her rear-view mirror.  First, for many 
people, the use of large dogs has an intimidating character.  “Drug dogs ‘are 
large, and to many ordinary innocent people, fearsome animals,’ and hence 
the ‘intrusion of these dogs is offensive to some, frightening to others, and, 
sadly, to at least a few, reminiscent of the ugliest types of scenes that have 
occurred in police states.’”270  Second, the use of the drug sniffing dog for a 
 
264. LAFAVE, supra note 18, § 9.3(g), at 400. 
265. Id. 
266. Id. 
267. Id.  LaFave characterizes Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005), which he 
extensively critiques earlier in section 9.3(b), as follows: 
[I]n the Caballes case a majority of the Supreme Court missed this point completely 
and, in rather summary fashion, overturned a sound state court decision by merely 
declaring (contrary to its own prior decisions) that nonsearch activity cannot constitute 
a violation of the Terry scope limitation.  Had the Court not taken that misstep, it 
would have had occasion to consider the petitioner’s claim that use of a drug dog as in 
Caballes is not merely no search, but a total ‘non-event,’ no different than if the 
officer, standing by to receive the driver’s license and registration, were instead 
handed a bag of cocaine.  But this is most assuredly not the case, for such use of drug 
dogs produces many unpleasant and adverse consequences even for an innocent 
motorist. 
LAFAVE, supra note 18, § 9.3(f), at 401. 
268. Id. 
269. 4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 9.3(f), at 32-34 (4th ed. Supp. 2006). 
270. Id. at 32 (quoting United States v. DiCesare, 765 F.2d 890, 901 (9th Cir. 1985)). 
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person not otherwise suspected of a crime is “an accusatory act, one which 
will be upsetting to the innocent motorist because it will appear he has been 
singled out as a drug suspect for reasons about which he can only specu-
late.”271  Third, the use of the dog is also “likely to be humiliating to the 
driver of the vehicle, for such use manifests police suspicion of the driver as 
a drug courier to all those who may pass by while the scenario is being 
played out on the side of an interstate highway or city street.”272  Fourth, the 
use of the dog may cause delay to the driver and any passengers.273  Finally, 
perhaps most telling for this article’s premise and appeal to the legislature, 
the use of drug dogs “in wholesale fashion without individualized suspicion 
creates an unnecessary and unjustified risk that many motorists totally 
innocent of any wrongdoing regarding drugs will be subjected to an 
extended and exhaustive roadside search of their vehicles.”274 
Courts almost invariably find that a drug dog’s alert constitutes 
probable cause to search the vehicle and its occupants.275  But doing so 
without a reasonable suspicion prerequisite creates what we hope the 
legislature will find to be an unacceptable risk of “false positives.”  LaFave 
recounts the danger as described in a law review article examining the 
training and reliability of narcotics detection dogs.276  Assume a dog and 
handler accuracy rate of 98%, that 0.5% of the population has drugs in their 
possession, and 10,000 random drug sniffs.  Of 10,000 people, only 50 
individuals (10,000 x 0.005) will possess drugs, and the dog will find 49 of 
them (50 x 0.98).  Nine thousand nine hundred fifty individuals of the 
10,000 will not possess drugs, but the dog will erroneously alert to 199 
(9950 x 0.02).  This example statistically underscores the main point of our 
proposal—the cost to innocent citizens of excessive zeal to catch drug 
offenders.  Those 199 innocent individuals are not just subjected to the 
unjustified intimidation, humiliation, accusation, and suspicion of the dog 
sniff itself; the alert will lead to a thorough search of the vehicle and its 
occupants for the drugs.  We agree with LaFave that the correct result is 
obtained in Minnesota, where, in State v. Wiegand,277 the Minnesota 
Supreme Court found that even though the sniff itself was not a search, the 
 
271. Id. at 63.  LaFave goes on to explain why the use of dogs for individual traffic stops is 
worse than the use of dogs at a checkpoint for all persons stopped; condemned by the United 
States Supreme Court in City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000). 
272. Id. 
273. Id. 
274. Id. at 34. 
275. Id. 
276. Id. (relying on Robert C. Bird, An Examination of the Training and Reliability of the 
Narcotics Detection Dog, 85 KY. L.J. 405, 427-32 (1997). 
277. 645 N.W.2d 125 (Minn. 2002). 
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stop was prolonged beyond the time necessary to issue a warning ticket for 
a burned out headlight.278  LaFave praises and summarizes the Minnesota 
approach as follows: 
Proceeding step by step, the court reasoned (1) that “the Terry 
principles are appropriately applied in this case”; (2) that “Terry 
authorizes us to balance the nature and quality of the intrusion into 
the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the impor-
tance of the governmental interests as [sic] stake”; (3) that “there 
is some intrusion into privacy interests by a dog sniff”; and (4) that 
consequently the Fourth Amendment requires “a reasonable, 
articulable suspicion of drug-related criminal activity before law 
enforcement may conduct a dog sniff around a motor vehicle 
stopped for a routine equipment violation in an attempt to detect 
the presence of narcotics.”279 
We have little confidence that the North Dakota Supreme Court would 
follow the persuasive reasoning of the Minnesota Supreme Court.  As 
explained above, the North Dakota Supreme Court has shown little or no 
concern for the rights of innocent drivers subjected to extensive criminal 
investigation techniques when stopped for noncriminal offenses.  Thus, we 
propose a legislative reasonable suspicion requirement for the use of 
narcotics dogs. 
C. LEGISLATIVE EXCLUSIONARY REMEDY 
The authors are not particularly fond of the exclusionary rule.  Indeed, 
coauthor Lockney, in an Open Letter to the North Dakota Attorney General 
published in this journal over twenty years ago, offered a proposal for a 
way to avoid the evils of the exclusionary rule.280  The legislature, the 
executive branch, and the courts have not shown any inclination to pursue 
that proposal.  In lieu of an alternative that is likely to ensure the respect for 
the privacy of motorists promoted by our proposed legislative limits, we 
reluctantly conclude that the police are unlikely to restrict their tendency to 
pursue criminal investigations of noncriminal traffic offenders and their 
passengers.281 
 
278. Wiegand, 645 N.W.2d at 127-39. 
279. LAFAVE, supra note 18, § 9.3, at 402. 
280. Lockney, supra note 46, at 26-32. 
281. Of course, it is also possible to begin to implement the proposal that coauthor Lockney 
made years ago to provide an alternative to the exclusionary remedy.  See generally id. (discussing 
a proposed alternative to the exclusionary rule.)  That alternative would require clearer rules 
(made administratively, or, perhaps, as proposed here, by legislation), education to assure police 
knowledge of the rules, and a record of serious enforcement against the police for violations of the 
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D. ALTERNATIVE PROPOSAL FOR MAXIMUM CRIME CONTROL—
OPEN AND HONEST LEGISLATIVE RATIFICATION OF THE 
STATUS QUO 
We understand that there will be opposition to part or all of our pro-
posed legislation.  Each part changes the status quo.  The status quo guaran-
tees two things:  (1) more criminals are caught, and (2) more innocent 
drivers and passengers have their privacy invaded.282  Professor LaFave and 
others have many practical and reasonable suggestions to protect the 
privacy of motorists as a matter of judicial interpretation of the Fourth 
Amendment.  We have little confidence his suggestions will be followed by 
either federal or North Dakota state courts.  Thus, we propose the legisla-
ture examine each issue from the perspective of traffic offenders stopped 
for noncriminal traffic violations, such as the judge in our introductory 
 
rules.  Thereafter, it was proposed that a court, ultimately the United States Supreme Court, could 
be urged to find a North Dakota alternative sufficient to protect privacy and justify an exception to 
the exclusionary rule. 
For years, coauthor Lockney has realistically or cynically—depending on your point of 
view—suggested to his students that nothing has happened because the powers that be are happy 
with the status quo.  They can claim, on the one hand, that we have a Constitutional exclusionary 
rule and thus take Constitutional rights seriously—keeping liberals happy.  But, on the other hand, 
the police and prosecution authorities know that the courts find many exceptions to the exclu-
sionary rule and, when that is not possible, weaken the protections of the Fourth Amendment to 
the point where the police are not often seriously inhibited from doing what they need to do to get 
evidence for conviction of the guilty—keeping the law and order side happy.  In other words, we 
have our cake (show a civil rights friendly face) and eat it too (create weak limits on the police 
and numerous exceptions to the exclusionary rule for the occasional violation the courts cannot 
avoid).  As a final alternative—or perhaps in addition to exclusion of resulting evidence—minimal 
revisions could be made to North Dakota Century Code section 39-07-10, which provides an 
officer violating the legislative limits “is guilty of misconduct in office and is subject to removal 
from office.”  N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-07-10 (2009). 
282. Professor Harris noted the tradeoff in 1998: 
Of course, there is a benefit to such broad police power: law enforcement will catch 
more criminals.  Police will use the law to stop cars, question drivers, and search 
vehicles; this will result in a greater number of apprehensions than if they had more 
limited discretion.  But if this is the main benefit of these cases, one must also note an 
important, and usually disregarded, cost; for each wrongdoer intercepted, some much 
larger number of absolutely innocent people are also stopped, questioned, and often 
searched—in short, treated like criminals.  Moreover, this will not be spread evenly 
across all citizens.  African Americans and people of color will suffer this treatment in 
numbers far out of proportion to their representation in the driving population. 
Harris, supra note 13, at 558.  Like LaFave, Harris proposed that courts limit traffic stops to 
reasonable efforts to enforce traffic laws, limit questioning, require that officers advise drivers 
they need not consent and may limit the scope of consent, and limit “detection devices” like drug-
sniffing dogs. Id. at 585-89.  Ten years later, the courts are still not listening; thus, our legislative 
proposal.  Our legislation is in agreement with Harris’s conclusion that “[t]reating all citizens like 
criminals in order to catch the malefactors among us represents an unwise policy choice, an 
outlook favoring crime prevention over all of our other values,” and asks the legislature to provide 
limits the courts have avoided. Id. at 558. 
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hypothetical.283  We ask each legislator to consider the following questions 
regarding our suggested statute: 
 If you or a loved one is stopped for a noncriminal offense such 
as an obstructed windshield, do you want the police to be fairly 
sure you are committing the offense (probable cause), or less 
sure—thinking there’s a reasonable chance you might be com-
mitting an offense (reasonable suspicion)? 
 Do you want the officer to quickly and efficiently write your 
traffic ticket, or to be allowed to take her time and ask you ques-
tions about possible criminal violations for which there is no 
reasonable basis to believe you guilty? 
 Do you believe that in addition to being asked to produce your 
driver’s license, documentation of vehicle ownership, and proof 
of insurance, the officer, while checking for outstanding war-
rants on you, should also be allowed to check your criminal 
history without any particular reason to believe you may be a 
convicted criminal? 
 Do you believe the officer should be allowed to ask your pas-
sengers for identification and check their record for outstanding 
warrants and criminal history without any articulable reason to 
believe anything will turn up? 
 Do you want the officer to be authorized to ask you questions 
unrelated to the reason for your stop—about drugs, weapons, or 
other contraband—without any reasonable suspicion you may 
have something illegal in your car? 
 Do you want the officer to be able to ask you questions about 
your travel plans? 
 After you deny possession of drugs or anything else illegal, do 
you want the officer to be able to ask you for consent to search 
your car absent any reasonable suspicion anything will be 
found? 
 Should the officer be able to enlist the aid of a drug detection 
dog to sniff you and your vehicle for the presence of drugs, thus 
subjecting you to the resulting indignation and the possibility of 
 
283. Id.  Professor Harris suggested courts should examine “the full cost” of the broad power 
of the police in the war on drugs:  “Any fair discussion of the effort to interdict drugs through 
traffic stops must take into account the bother, fear, embarrassment, and even humiliation that 
law-abiding people must tolerate in order that this ‘war’ be waged.” Id. at 580.  Because the courts 
have not, we hope the legislature will. 
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a false alert, which will lead to a thorough search and more 
delay, even without a reasonable suspicion to believe you have 
drugs prior to the dog sniff? 
A negative answer to any of these questions favors our proposed legis-
lation on the point of agreement.  If, however, the North Dakota Legislature 
believes that motorists have no reason to object to the currently “routine” 
procedures treating minor traffic offenders like criminals in order to find a 
small subset of them to be true criminals, it should enact our alternative 
statute.  To clearly guide police, and to warn drivers and passengers of what 
is permissible if our proposed legislation is rejected, we urge honest legisla-
tive ratification of the status quo via the following alternative legislation: 
Anybody may be stopped for any traffic or parking violation, 
whether serious or noncriminal, based on reasonable suspicion 
alone.  Once stopped, the officer may require not only production 
of a driver’s license, documentation of the vehicle’s ownership and 
registration, and proof of insurance, but may also ask questions 
unrelated to the traffic offense for which the stop was made.  In 
addition to checking for outstanding warrants for the driver, the 
officer may, for no particular reason, run a criminal history check 
of the driver.  Passengers may be asked to identify themselves 
even when not suspected of any criminal activity.  Warrant, 
license, and criminal history checks of passengers may also be 
made for no particular reason.  The officer may ask about the 
possession of drugs or weapons and for consent to search the car 
without any particular reason to believe there are drugs or weapons 
in the car.  The officer may also use a drug detection dog to deter-
mine the possible presence of drugs in the car without any reason-
able basis to suspect the presence of drugs. 
It is possible that today, long after Orwell’s 1984284 and well into the 
not-so-brave new post-9/11 world, our expectations of privacy have eroded 
to the point where most legislators or the majority of drivers and voters in 
North Dakota would reject the increase in privacy that our proposal offers 
because of the reduction in prosecution of drug offenders and drunk drivers 
it admittedly entails.  Consideration of the proposed legislation will allow 
that trade-off to be debated and decided openly and comprehensively, 
outside the narrow and prosecution-favorable context of a specific criminal 
court case. 
 
284. GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 (1961). 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Appellate judges in criminal appeals are generally faced with issues 
raised by guilty criminals.  Defendants found innocent by the police are 
released on the scene; those found not guilty by trial judges or juries have 
nothing to appeal; appellants, therefore, are complaining about traffic stops 
that discovered their guilt.  Appellate courts are thus asked whether the 
police, who used this procedure to produce a conviction of this guilty crimi-
nal, should be told that to protect the rights of others, this particular proce-
dure will not be allowed, knowing that if it does so the appellant will get a 
new trial and possibly an acquittal.  The deck is stacked in favor of the 
“correct” result—affirmation of the conviction of the guilty criminal, rather 
than restricting the police in order to protect other motorists who may be 
innocent.  Each individual issue—basis for stop, duration of stop, questions, 
identity and records checks, requests for consent to search, drug sniffing 
dogs, etc.—seems “trivial” compared to the cost of favoring the guilty 
criminal; without consideration of the other stop procedures not involved or 
raised in the particular case. 
The questions we pose to the legislature, however, allow for a compre-
hensive look at the total picture—and the privacy of all drivers and pas-
sengers in North Dakota.  How many time-consuming and embarrassing, 
even to innocent drivers, procedures will we authorize the police to use to 
produce additional drug and drunk driving convictions?  If the answer is 
“any and all,” then we propose that decision be made openly and honestly 
by the legislators for all North Dakota motorists.  If the status quo is main-
tained, all concerned North Dakotans should be aware of the fact that their 
precious state and federal constitutional right to be free from unreasonable 
searches and seizures on the road is, in reality, a sham. 
As the authors have discussed for over ten years, any reasonably astute 
police officer can stop any vehicle virtually at will.  And, under current law, 
that officer may treat noncriminal offenders and passengers in many similar 
ways as criminals, without any reasonable basis to suspect crime.  Our 
proposed legislation imposes limits on existing judicially-created authority 
to employ criminal procedures in dealing with people who are not suspected 
of any criminal offense. 
